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1 
Introduction 
In Plutarch’s history of Caesar, he makes note of a moment in which Caesar was reading 1
of Alexander the Great. In this story, Caesar weeps at his supposed lack of accomplishments in 
comparison to Alexander. Plutarch quotes Caesar as saying, “Don’t you agree that it is a matter 
for tears? When Alexander was my age, he was already master of so many nations- and I have 
not yet done anything distinguished at all.”  Plutarch places this event happening around the time 2
of Caesar’s governorship of Spain. This would make Caesar about 39-40, making him a little 
under a decade older than Alexander at the time of his death. The exact origin of this story is 
unknown and could have been put about by either his supporters or his detractors.  Narratively, 3
the notion that Caesar desired to one day surpass Alexander’s accomplishments fits well with 
how history would unfold.  
In the year 40 B.C.E, a little more than a decade after Caesar supposedly wept over the 
lack of his accomplishments, he is able to watch as Pompey’s forces are routed by Caesar’s own 
men. He can see the numerically superior and better supplied Pompeian army flee from the battle 
hardened veterans of his Gallic campaign. It had been about a year since Caesar had crossed over 
the Rubicon, effectively declaring the beginning of the war that would change the course of 
Rome. Years of political positioning, speeches, and military campaigning had led to this very 
moment. Had he failed, Caesar most certainly would have either died on the battlefield or in the 
hands of his greatest political opponents, the optimates. With his death, his accomplishments 
would have been all for nought, as he would have instead been remembered as the man who 
failed to take Rome.  
1 ​I use the following translations for the ancient sources in this part: Plutarch’s ​Caesar​: Christopher Pelling,  
2 ​Plutarch, ​Caesar ​ 11.6 
3 ​Christopher Pelling, trans., ​Plutarch Caesar​ (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 184.  
2 
On the other side of the battlefield, Pompey withdrew back to his camp. What had 
seemed like an unlosable battle had quickly turned into one of the greatest military upsets in 
history. Pompey had been likened (by himself and his supporters) to that of Alexander the Great, 
and now he found himself, against all odds, running from the battlefield. Pompey had defeated 
Mithridates, conquered the east in the name of Rome, subdued the pirates of the Mediterranean, 
and was expected by many to easily emerge victorious against the rebellious Caesar. Now, his 
forces lie scattered, his support crumbling, and himself fleeing with his life. Pompey would go 
on to flee to Egypt in an attempt to raise another army against Caesar. However, he would be 
betrayed by the young pharaoh of Egypt, beheaded, and presented to Caesar as a gift in hopes of 
receiving support in his squabble with his sister. As Caesar would agree, it was an unfitting end 
to a man thought of as the Roman Alexander.  
After Pompey’s death, Caesar would go on to win the Civil War. Though others tried to 
stand in Caesar’s way, after the battle of Pharsalus Caesar simply could not be stopped. How is it 
that he was able to defeat Pompey? Caesar had been outnumbered and undersupplied, and 
Pompey had the legitimacy of the Senate mostly on his side. Herein lies the undoing of Pompey 
and by the extension the Republic’s: the optimates. Whereas Caesar was able to make his own 
decisions, Pompey had the difficult task of placating the incessant complaints and opinions of the 
exiled optimates. The optimates were essentially the faction in the senate that would use any 
political measure to maintain the status quo, and therefore the continuation of what was 
essentially an oligarchy. After Caesar crossed the Rubicon and descended on Rome, many of the 
optimates found themselves in Pompey’s camp, and followed him and his army. These men had 
been a thorn in the side of both Caesar and Pompey alike, and at one time both them had stood 
 
3 
together against the optimates during the time of the First Triumvirate. The optimates were a 
major hindrance to Pompey, as were politics in general. This would prove to be his undoing, as 
his inability to stand up to the optimates directly led to his decision to face Caesar at Pharsalus. 
Both Caesar and Pompey are deserving of praise for their accomplishments as military 
leaders. Caesar was victorious in the west and Pompey in the east; their deeds are comparable in 
greatness. However, Pompey’s accomplishments are overshadowed by his defeat at the hands of 
Caesar; Caesar is remembered as the conqueror of Rome, and Pompey his defeated rival. The 
two differed greatly in method, with Pompey preferring caution while Caesar chose brashness 
and trickery. It was this difference that made Pompey the perfect person to deal with Caesar, but 
it was his political ineptitude that led to his failure. 
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Part 1 
 ​Chapter 1: Early Life of the Roman Alexander 
To truly understand Pompey and his motivations, a look back at his early life is required. 4
Like most people, Pompey’s family and their position played an integral role in who Pompey 
was. As is the case with many of the major political figures in Rome, Pompey’s family was one 
of the established ruling senate dynasties, or a Patrician family. However, his family joined the 
ranks of the elite rather late into the life of the Roman Republic, only truly coming to 
prominence in the year 141 BCE with Q. Pompeius stepping into the role of consul.  Pompey’s 5
family had a place in the upper echelons of Roman society, but the family member who would 
truly have the greatest influence on Pompey and his future would be his father Pompeius Strabo.  
Born in 106 BCE, Pompey quickly became familiar with internal conflicts that threatened 
Roman hegemony. In 91 BCE, Rome was launched into what would become known as the 
Social War. Many of Rome’s Italian allies had become increasingly disgruntled by the fact that 
they had not received Roman citizenship. This eventually led to a full scale war, with Rome 
fighting their once close allies. Pompey’s father played a large part in this conflict, and while 
there is no way of knowing if Pompey actually fought alongside his father, “... it would be out of 
character…” if he had not done so.  The difficulty with the Social War was that the Italian allies 6
knew all of the Romans’ ‘tactics and training’, which led to a drawn out war that claimed many 
4 ​I use the following translations for the ancient sources in this part: Plutarch’s ​Pompey​- Pamela Mensch, Plutarch’s 
Sertorius​- Bernadotte Perrin, Velleius Paterculus’ ​Roman History​- J.C. Yardley and Anthony A Barret, Cassius 
Dio’s ​Roman History​- Earnest Cary, Appian’s ​Roman History​- Horace White, Cicero’s ​Pro Lege Man​- Humphrey 
Grose Hodge, Cicero’s ​Letters to Atticus​- E. O. Winstedt, Cicero’s ​Letters to Friends​- D. R. Shackleton Bailey, 
Sallust’s ​Histories​- William W. Batstone 
5 ​Robin Seager, ​Pompey The Great: A Political Biography​, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 20. 
6 ​Peter Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman Alexander​ (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981), 5. 
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Roman lives.  The war ended in 87 BCE, meaning at the young age of 19, Pompey had already 7
witnessed and potentially fought in a conflict that threatened to tear his country apart. This not 
only set Pompey on his way to a fruitful military career, but it also foreshadows the Roman 
internal conflicts that would shape Pompey’s life.  
The next major event in Pompey’s life would be the conflict between Lucius Cornelius 
Sulla and Gaius Marius. Both great leaders in their own right, these two would end up at each 
other's’ throats. Both wanted the glory of conquering the kingdom of Pontus, which had begun to 
attack eastern Roman settlements in the wake of the Social War.  Sulla eventually won out and 8
embarked for Asia, but while he was away, an army led by Marius and his ally Lucius Cornelius 
Cinna set their eyes on the city of Rome. Pompey’s father was entreated by the Marians to join 
their cause, but Strabo hesitated on choosing a side. Cinna eventually sent an assassin to kill 
Strabo and recruit his men which ended up failing. However, after the failed assassination 
attempt, many of Strabo’s men expressed their discontentment, and began to march off to join up 
with Marius and Cinna. Upon seeing this, Plutarch states that Pompey went, “...about among the 
soldiers, entreated them with tears, and… threw himself face-down… and lay in their way, 
weeping and bidding those who were marching off to trample him.”  Strabo’s men, upon seeing 9
this display, decided to stay with their general and defend Rome. While Pompey’s actions may 
have worked, they stand in sharp contrast with how Caesar handled disloyal troops. Caesar 
demanded loyalty and bravery from his men, and shamed those who would not give it. Pompey, 
instead, pleaded for it.  
7 ​Lee L. Brice, ed., ​Warfare in the Roman Republic: From the Etruscan Wars to the Battle of Actium​ (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 187. 
8 ​Velleius Paterculus, ​Roman History​ 2.18.1 
9 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 3 
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Marius eventually took Rome after the death of Pompey’s father (who had fallen ill to a 
plague).  Upon taking Rome, Marius and Cinna set themselves up as consuls and began their 10
rule, though Marius would die shortly after taking power from a heart attack. Sulla would not 
stay in Asia forever though and in 83 BCE he began to make his way back home, reigniting the 
tensions in Rome. After his father’s death, Pompey became the head of the household and had to 
decide which side to take. Strangely enough, Pompey at first decided to lend aid to Cinna and his 
army. Whatever Pompey’s reasoning for joining with his father’s enemy, he soon regretted his 
decision. Upon arriving in Cinna’s camp, he quickly realized his unpopularity amongst the 
Marians and was met with a plethora of accusations against him.  Pompey ended up changing 11
his mind and instead went off to aid Sulla, but his original choice remains baffling. Pompey 
willingly put himself in a place of great danger amongst many who wished to see him dead. Even 
in his younger years, Pompey seemed to have a knack for choosing those who cared little for his 
well being.  
The young Roman hastily made up for his blunder under the leadership of Sulla. Before 
even joining the returning general’s forces, Pompey raised his own army and saw victory twice 
against two smaller Marian forces. The first came shortly after Pompey set off from Picenum (a 
region in Italy) to meet with Sulla. A clever cavalry charge led by Pompey brought the death of 
the leader of the enemies cavalry, which had the domino effect of plunging the entire army into 
chaos and an eventual rout.  The second victory occurred on the River Aesis, where Pompey 12
was able to maneuver the enemies cavalry onto unfavorable terrain, thus rendering their horses 
10 ​Seager, ​Pompey The Great​, 9. 
11 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 13. 
12 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 7 
 
7 
useless.  These victories made up for Pompey’s earlier blunder of siding with the hostile 13
Marians, especially in the eyes of Sulla who welcomed the young general with open arms. His 
skill as a general made up for his poor decision. 
Eventually, Sulla and his men took back Rome and ousted the Marians. Once Sulla was 
in power, he began to purge many of his political opponents who had even the slightest relation 
to Marius and his cause. The new dictator also began to strengthen his ties to his allies, and 
insisted that Pompey divorce his wife and marry Sulla’s stepdaughter Aemilia. Unlike Caesar, 
who was faced with a similar dilemma, Pompey accepted Sulla’s proposal. Peter Greenhalgh 
does point out that Pompey was, “...dependent on continued favour for the promotion of a most 
unconventional career…”, but this is still a telling moment of his character.  While definitely a 14
difficult situation, Pompey still bowed to those in power (directly contrasting a young Julius 
Caesar presented with the same demand). Plutarch comments that the marriage, “...was a product 
of tyranny, and suited the advantage of Sulla rather than the character and habits of Pompey…”  15
The whole affair turned out to be fruitless in the end anyway, as shortly after joining Pompey’s 
household she died of a miscarriage. 
After the death of his new wife, Pompey was assigned to the island of Sicily and began to 
mop up any Marian supporters who had fled there.  He then set off towards Africa (on the 16
orders of Sulla), where an army of Marians had gathered led by Domitius Ahenobarbus. The two 
armies met, but when a powerful storm hit Domitius ordered his men to retreat so that they did 
not fight under hostile conditions. Pompey seized his chance, and attacked the enemy under the 
13 Ibid., 7 
14 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 21. 
15 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 9 
16 ​Ibid., 12 
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cover of the storm, surprising the Marian rebels.  While it was a hard fought battle, Pompey’s 17
surprise attack gave his army the upper hand and brought about their victory. Following his 
defeat of Domitius, Pompey made an expedition into Numidia, reigniting their fears of Rome and 
further gaining fame for himself. Pompey was continuing to show his abilities as a general, even 
at the young age of 24. So great so were his deeds that he was given the surname ‘Magnus’ (the 
Great) and able to secure a triumph (after some deliberating with Sulla) even though he was not a 
consul or Praetor.  A triumph was one, if not the, greatest rewards a Roman general could 18
receive for his deeds, ensuring all knew of their achievements. In his early years, he showed 
talent as a smart and bold, potentially even careless, general that earned the respect of his 
superiors (though his tendency to throw away caution would wither away with experience). 
Pompey was not completely under the heel of Sulla, which he showed in the waning days 
of the dictators political and natural life. When Sulla held the next election for the consuls, 
Pompey lent his support to Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, a populare and enemy of Sulla.  Lepidus 19
would end up winning the consulship, along with Quintus Lutatius Catulus who was a staunch 
supporter of Sulla and his regime. At the end of his term, Lepidus refused to give up his 
consulship and led a group of insurgents against the senate in hopes of achieving an immediate 
second term.  Pompey joined the nobility against Lepidus, and was able to subdue Lepidus’ 20
garrisons, forcing the rebellious consul to give up his siege of Rome and flee to Sardinia.  With 21
the threat defeated, Pompey did not disband his troops. With his army, Pompey was able to 
pressure the senate into allowing him to wage war against Quintus Sertorius, a populare who had 
17 ​Ibid., 12 
18 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 28​. 
19 Ibid., 33 
20 Seager, ​Pompey The Great​, 31. 
21 ​Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 16 
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taken up arms against the senate in Spain. Even though he was still so young, Pompey had 
managed to secure a position usually reserved for a consul. His accomplishments as a general 
were propelling him up the ladder of Roman politics, and with an army at his back he easily got 
what he wanted. 
 
After the failure of his fellow Marians and Populares, Sertorius had taken up refuge in 
Spain, where he had managed to to wage an extremely successful guerilla war against Sullan 
regime. General after general had sought Sertorius out, only to find themselves woefully 
outmatched by the Marian rebel. Sertorius’ rebellion posed multiple threats to Rome. Other than 
it being a mark of shame (since so many of Rome’s generals had failed to end the uprising), it 
also posed threats abroad. News of the Roman rebel travelled fast, and there were those who saw 
this as a chance to bring Rome down a peg. Specifically, Mithridates of Pontus, who lent his 
support to Sertorius’ cause in the form of money and ships.  All of this must have made 22
Pompey’s desire to face Sertorius even greater. Though he was still young, his military 
achievements thus far had catapulted him up the Roman ranks, and defeating the last remnant of 
the Marian resistance would surely help him continue this trajectory. Sertorius must have seemed 
like just another step to glory.  
With his unhindered success so far, it seems unlikely that Pompey was unaware of the 
tribulations that awaited him. Sertorius was an enemy unlike any that Pompey had yet faced. The 
Marian rebel had establishes his own little kingdom in Spain, and brought with him Roman 
22 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 52​. 
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customs that helped transform the region into his own personal war machine. As historian Peter 
Greenhalgh explains: 
For Sertorius was more than a great soldier that had mastered guerilla warfare. By introducing 
Roman drill and signals he had turned bands of robbers into highly disciplined yet flexible fighting 
forces that could both outfight and outmaneuver Roman legions under more conventional 
generals… He also knew the value of fine array, and by providing his troops with beautiful cloaks 
and setting their shields and helmets ablaze with gold and silver decorations he developed an 
esprit de corps​… The fathers were proud to see their sons going to and from school in the 
purple-bordered togas worn by Roman schoolboys, and the lads themselves became devoted to 
Sertorius, whom they swore to protect with their lives.  23
 
Sertorius had created an army devoted to him and that was willing to lay down their lives for his 
cause. Additionally, they relied on more unconventional tactics, that left traditional generals 
(such as Pompey), generally bewildered on how to deal with them. In some ways, Sertorius and 
his army were similar to that of Caesar and his veteran legions. Sertorius would quickly prove to 
be the first real threat to Pompey, and would teach him lessons that would prove to be useful, 
especially against Caesar.  
After he had been given the okay by the senate, Pompey left to go join his fellow Roman 
and governor of the Spanish province Metellus. Metellus himself had experienced multiple 
humiliations at the hands of Sertorius, and those who had tried to give him aid before Pompey 
had fallen to unfortunate fates. With the news of Pompey’s arrival, many saw it as the end of 
Sertorius, with some cities in Spain even pondering changing their allegiances.  All of this 24
changed after the two exchanged blows for the first time. The initial meeting of the two forces 
occurred at the city of Lauron, which Sertorius was besieging. Pompey had rushed to relieve the 
city, and upon arrival thought that the conflict would be over quickly. He had managed to trap 
Sertorius between his own forces and the city, and believed that Sertorius had nowhere to go. 
23 Ibid., 43 
24 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 18 
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Though he was unwilling to attack up the hill that Sertorius had made camp on, Pompey believed 
he could siege out the besiegers.  
Or so he thought, for Pompey had fallen right into Sertorius’ trap. Sertorius had left a 
contingent of his forces behind in his older camp to wait out Pompey, and those forces had now 
revealed themselves.  In Pompey’s arrogance and carelessness, he had taken Sertorius’ bait and 25
now found that he was the one surrounded. These new forces had taken a position on a hill 
behind Pompey’s forces and trapped them, for if Pompey made the foolish decision to attack 
either of the hill encampments, the other would surely come down and attack Pompey from the 
rear. Faced with this precarious situation, Pompey began sending out his men to forage for food. 
After hearing of a coordinated raid on one group, he sent out a legion to relieve them. They too 
were quickly overwhelmed, and Pompey set out with his entire army to save them, only to find 
himself outmaneuvered once again by Sertorius’ army which had taken the high ground.  He 26
could only watch as his men, and later the city of Lauron, were destroyed by Sertorius’ forces. 
His carelessness had led to his defeat. 
Pompey retired from Spain and returned the next campaign season in hopes of reclaiming 
lost dignity. Initially, he found success as he was victorious over some of Sertorius’ allies. 
However, if there were any in Pompey’s camp who had hoped he had learned from previous 
mistakes, they were soon disappointed. After his early victories, Pompey rushed off to face 
Sertorius himself, without his ally Metellus. Plutarch states that this brash move was influenced 
by a desire to keep all the victory to himself and not share it with his fellow Roman.  This could 27
not have been better news for Sertorius, as it kept his enemies divided. The battle that ensued 
25 Plutarch, ​Sertorius ​18.4 
26 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 48. 
27 ​Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 19 
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between Pompey and Sertorius was inconclusive, with neither side winning a clear victory. 
There were losers in the battle however, and they were mostly on Pompey’s side. Pompey 
himself was wounded in the melee while commanding the right flank, and ended up having to 
flee from battle.  The left flank had found more success and even managed to push forward into 28
the enemy camp, until they were set upon by the rest of Sertorius’ army and took heavy losses.  29
The battle itself had few consequences for both sides, but it could have been much more 
catastrophic for Pompey. His eagerness to face his enemy alone nearly cost him his life, and 
perhaps if he had waited for his ally Metellus they may have seen a clear victory on that day.  
After his encounter with Sertorius, Pompey met back up with Metellus in hopes that the 
two could bring an end to this rebellion. They found themselves constantly hounded by 
Sertorius’ guerilla tactics (as a pitched battle against both Pompey and Metellus was out of the 
picture for the Marian general). The two Roman generals again tried to besiege Sertorius at the 
city of Clunia, but this too failed as a relief force came to Sertorius’ aid.  Another campaigning 30
season had come and gone, and Pompey once again had to face the reality that his war was not 
going well.  
His acceptance of this fact is shown in a letter he wrote to the senate. The ancient 
historian Gaius Sallustius Crispus (more commonly known as Sallust) claims to know what was 
written in the letter. In it, Pompey admits to his own failings, “For my part, I acknowledge that I 
set out for this war with more enthusiasm than strategy...” but he also warned the senate what 
would happen if they did not give him aid: “You are what is left. If you do not help… my army 
28 ​Ibid., 19 
29 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 49. 
30 Ibid., 50. 
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will cross from here into Italy and with it will come the entire Spanish war.”  The idea of an 31
independent and hostile Spain (as well as the return of an angry Pompey) frightened the senate 
enough so that they quickly lent Pompey the aid he desired. This letter had come after Pompey’s 
previous letters to the senate had failed to drum up support.  It had taken him a while, but finally 32
Pompey had managed to get what he wanted, and, if Sallust’s account is to be believed, it only 
took him threatening mutual destruction to do it. 
Now all Pompey had to do was find a way to use this newfound assistance in an effective 
way. Clearly, his approach to Sertorius up until this point was entirely ineffective. Sertorius had 
proven himself capable when it came to pitched battle, and when full scale conflict was not an 
option, his troops were extremely effective at switching to guerilla tactics to hound Pompey’s 
forces and cut off their supplies. Furthermore, Pompey’s brash nature had done him a disservice 
on more than one occasion, and his lack of caution had brought him closer to total defeat than he 
had ever been before. Pompey was not going to find a glorious victory after an intense battle, he 
needed to play it much slower. This leads to some complications however, as Greenhalgh points 
out: “It was not the most exciting kind of warfare and our sources give it scant attention…”  33
Pompey’s strategy was not very exciting; he essentially bided his time and set siege to multiple 
cities in the region in an effort to wear Sertorius and his men down. 
While slow, this tactic worked as Sertorius’ men began to resent him, none more so than 
fellow Roman Perpenna. Perpenna sought Sertorius’ position, and hated being under his 
command. Many of the other Romans under Sertorius’ command shared Perpenna’s sentiments. 
Plutarch quotes Perpenna: “...we came to this land of destruction with the idea of living like 
31 Sallust, ​Histories​ 2.98 
32 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 51. 
33 Ibid., 53. 
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freemen, and are now voluntarily slaves in the body-guard of Sertorius the exile…”  Indeed, as 34
the war dragged on, many in Sertorius’ camp must have begun to wonder what it was they were 
exactly fighting for. Marius and Cinna had been dead for years now; Sertorius was all that was 
left. They were now essentially fighting for Sertorius and his new Spanish kingdom. Internal 
conflict began to spread, especially between the Romans who had stayed loyal to Sertorius and 
the Spanish.  Eventually, Perpenna turned on his leader out of envy and ambition and had him 35
killed. Pompey did not need to defeat Sertorius in open combat, simply waiting his enemy out 
showed the cracks in their system. 
Without Sertorius, the rebellion did not stand a chance against the combined might of 
Metellus and Pompey. Perpenna was no Sertorius, as much as he may have wanted to be. Upon 
hearing that Sertorius was no longer in charge, Pompey quickly set out to finish the war. He sent 
out a contingent of men to act as bait, which Perpenna quickly took. After routing the smaller 
Pompeian force, Perpenna was inspired by this victory and chased after them with eagerness. 
This was when Pompey revealed himself and joined the battle, quickly defeating Perpenna.  36
Pompey essentially lured Perpenna into the same feeling of overconfidence that he had felt at the 
beginning of the campaign, and turned it on his new foe.  
The war with Sertorius had been an important time in Pompey’s life. During the conflict 
he had managed to make connections all across Spain, that proved to still be loyal even into his 
conflict with Caesar during the Civil War.  From Sertorius, Pompey learned the importance of 37
caution. He had only begun to see real success against Sertorius after he slowed down and began 
34 Plutarch, ​Sertorius ​25.2 
35 Ibid., 25.3 
36 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 20 
37 ​Seager, ​Pompey The Great​, 32. 
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taking his time. While this was not the most exciting of tactics, in the end it won him the day, 
and that is what really matters. Against an arguably better general and foe, Pompey found victory 
through the use of attrition tactics, simply waiting for his enemy to crumble.  
 
Pompey was now able to return to Italy, with another military success under his belt. 
While he had been away, the Italian peninsula had not been without its own conflict. The heart of 
the Roman Republic had been dealing with a slave uprising, led by the escaped gladiator 
Spartacus. Marcus Crassus, Pompey’s future fellow triumvirate member, had been fighting 
against the uprising for some time, and for the most part had brought the rebellion to an end save 
some smaller groups attempting to flee Italy. Upon his return, Pompey was able to catch some 
5,000 fugitive slaves and defeat them in battle. According to Plutarch, Pompey told the senate, 
“... Crassus had overthrown the gladiators in a pitched battle, but… he had plucked up the whole 
war by the roots.”  essentially taking credit, at least partially, for bringing an end to the war. 38
Pompey was allowed to celebrate a triumph in Rome for his victory in Spain, but stealing the 
glory from Crassus would prove to have a negative impact on Pompey’s political ambitions. 
Back in Rome, Pompey ran for the position of Consul. Unfortunately for Pompey 
however, Crassus also made a bid for the consulship, the man whose glory he had just attempted 
to steal. Pompey, at first, was delighted to hear that Crassus was running. He desired a chance to 
work with him and even helped campaign for Crassus.  The two ended up winning consular 39
positions, despite Pompey only being of equestrian rank.  However, despite Pompey being so 40
excited to work with Crassus, problems quickly arose. Plutarch says that the two, “... disagreed 
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about everything and constantly opposed each other.” for, “In the Senate, Crassus carried more 
weight; but among the people the power of Pompey was great.”  So great were their differences 41
that their year as consuls was, “... politically barren and virtually without achievement’.”42
Pompey’s year as consul was a difficult one. As Greenhalgh explains, Pompey, “... was a 
military rather than political animal…” and this showed when faced with a political adversary.  43
This is in stark contrast to Caesar, who had a far less agreeable fellow consul but still managed to 
be wildly successful. Pompey’s military achievements had catapulted him to the head of Roman 
politics, but the battlefield of the forum proved to be much harder for him to navigate than the 
battlefield of war.  
After his term as consul, Pompey began to retreat from political life. As Plutarch 
explains, “... life in a toga is apt to lower the reputation of men who have grown great by arms, 
and who are ill suited for civic equality.”  Indeed, in the years following his consulship, Pompey 44
was unable to continue his ambitions, shown by his inability to put friendly faces in consulship 
positions: “The elections of these years reveal the weakness of Pompeius’ position in urban 
politics…”  Pompey needed another crisis to fight; something to get him away from Roman 45
politics and back out fighting its enemies. Pompey’s new enemy came in the form of the Pirates 
that had been plaguing the Mediterranean. According to Plutarch, the pirates, “... had spread 
throughout our Mediterranean Sea, making it unnavigable and closed to all commerce.”  The 46
Roman people were becoming more and more fearful, and trade was being hindered.  
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The senate needed to find a solution, so the tribune Aulus Gabinius proposed giving an 
ex-consul full power over the Mediterranean and a large force to deal with its piracy problem. 
According to Cassius Dio, “He did not directly utter Pompey’s name, but it was easy to see that 
if once the populace should hear of any such proposition, they would choose him.”  Some 47
optimates in the senate opposed the bill at first as they thought Pompey already had too much 
power, but their objections were lost in the cries of the people and Pompey was appointed. 
Pompey’s military achievements had once again propelled him forward. Even though Pompey 
complained about this position being another burden for him to bear, this was exactly what he 
wanted.  48
The speed at which Pompey dispatched the pirates is truly impressive: “Within three 
months the war was over.”  While this may still seem like a larger chunk of time, the senate had 49
planned to allow Pompey to keep his command for three years.  He swept from west to east, 50
laying waste to pirate ships and freeing up the strangled Roman trade routes. Pompey’s swift 
defeat of the pirates did present a new problem however; he again had no enemy to fight. 
Pompey had an unbelievable amount of power at his fingertips, but nobody to direct it at.  
Luckily for Pompey, another proposal was put before the senate. This time, a tribune by 
the name of Gaius Manilius proposed that Pompey be given the command of the Third 
Mithridatic War against Mithridates of Pontus.  As with the pirate proposal, this new motion 51
was also met with opposition. Many of the optimates feared giving Pompey even more power. 
This time, Pompey’s ambitions were supported by the increasingly successful Cicero, who gave 
47 Cassius Dio,​ Roman History​ 36.23.5 
48 Ibid., 36.24.5 
49 ​Seager, ​Pompey The Great​, ​47. 
50 Cassius Dio, ​Roman History​ 36.37.1 
51 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 30 
 
18 
a speech on his behalf, praising Pompey’s deeds.  Dio makes mention of Cicero’s speech and 52
how it urged the senate to approve this law, but he also points to another rising star for his 
contributions to Pompey’s success: Julius Caesar. Just how much Caesar helped Pompey is hard 
to tell, but Dio points to Caesar’s courting of the public as a way to persuade the senators. 
Pompey’s appointment to command in the Third Mithridatic War occurred in large part due to 
the efforts of others and their rhetoric surrounding Pompey’s achievements, rather than 
Pompey’s own political abilities.  
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Chapter 2: Pompey in the East 
Pompey was put in charge of the Third Mithridatic War near the end of the conflict 
(similar to when he was granted command against Sertorius). Roman legions had been fighting 
on the Anatolian peninsula for some time under the command of Lucius Licinius Lucullus. 
While Lucullus had been generally successful, he was never able to catch King Mithridates of 
Pontus and his ally King Tigranes II of Armenia (who were the main obstacles of Roman 
expansion in the region). This caused discontent amongst his own men, eventually leading to 
Pompey’s appointment as the new commander over the area. Pompey was therefore selected to 
bring a decisive end to this war that had ravaged Rome’s eastern holdings for so long. 
Though war had been raging in Anatolia for some time, Pompey was not arriving to 
entirely beneficial circumstances, despite what the glory robbed Lucullus said. Mithridates had 
taken control over the Roman province of Pontus, and Tigranes was actively invading the region 
of Cappadocia.  Dio describes Mithridates army as “inferior” to Pompey’s, but it was still 53
sizeable.  Appian and Plutarch agree that Mithridates had amassed a force of 30,000 foot 54
soldiers, but Appian differs from Plutarch in the category of cavalry; Plutarch says Mithridates 
had 2,000 while Appian claims he had 3,000.  Pompey still had a fight on his hands 55
The real difficulty that faced Pompey was the region itself. After years of war, the land 
had become scarce of provisions, according to Appian, which acted as a double edged sword for 
Mithridates.  Yes, Mithridates’ men may be struggling to find food and water, but that would 56
mean Pompey’s army, which again was supposedly greater than Mithridates’, would also suffer 
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significantly. Mithridates played exactly into this and allowed Pompey to advance, while he 
retreated back into less ravaged lands. He hoped that the lack of provisions would in some way 
deter or hinder the Roman general. Pompey here shows another one of his strengths that would 
help him later in his war against Caesar: resource management. A supplied army is a functional 
army, and Pompey knew this well. Pompey had had his fleet take control over the Black Sea.  57
This allowed him to more easily ship in supplies and establish supply lines.  Of course, the 58
farther inland he went the longer his supply lines got, but Pompey quickly adapted: “... he was 
able to employ to his advantage a tactic he had learnt… from Sertorius in Spain… Pompey 
decided to follow the scorched trail of Mithridates no longer but to blaze one of his own into the 
most fertile lands of Lesser Armenia.”  This had the added effect of forcing Mithridates to cease 59
his flight from Pompey, and instead return to Armenia to defend it (since it was so rich in 
supplies). Pompey had taken a fairly negative situation and used it to his advantage. 
Mithridates now set himself up near Pompey’s camp on top of a hill. Pompey had 
fortified a position in open country for foraging, but Mithridates used this to his advantage and 
began raiding the Romans with his numerous cavalry. Realizing his unfavorable position, 
Pompey moved his own camp near a wooded area, effectively neutralizing Mithridates’ cavalry.
 Thus, a stand still in the conflict began, with neither parties wanting to engage the other. 60
Pompey did not want to fight uphill, and Mithridates opposed fighting a pitched battle against 
Pompey’s overall larger force.  However, Mithridates found himself in an unfavorable position 
supply wise, and was beginning to scrape the bottom of the barrel. Realizing that he could not 
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maintain his position for long, Mithridates managed to slip away in the darkness of night, forcing 
the surprised Pompey to continue his pursuit of him.  
It is difficult to say exactly what happened next, as Appian, Plutarch, and Dio all claim 
something different. It is known for sure that Pompey pursued Mithridates and engaged him, but 
how exactly is what is contested. All three accounts have the same outcome, but the tactics and 
the battle leading to that outcome are different depending on which ancient historian tells it, and 
which historian is to be believed has been debated by historians.  I have chosen to disregard 61
Appian’s own telling of the events, seeing how this is a study of Pompey and Appian makes little 
mention of Pompey’s actual involvement in the battle (and the fact that his version is the most 
different of the three). Plutarch gives an account that directly relates to the thesis of this paper, 
but is plagued by Plutarch’s tendency to dramatize events. Dio gives the most detailed account, 
but it has some impracticalities (such as Pompey ordering his men charge even though they 
should have been exhausted from marching).  Instead of picking one account over the other, I 62
have decided to discuss how they are similar and how this relates to Pompey himself.  
Both Dio and Plutarch claim that Pompey assaulted Mithridates at night (and this is what 
sets Appian apart as he claims the battle occurred during the day). The reason I am so hesitant to 
disregard Plutarch’s account is because of how he claims Pompey came to the decision of a night 
assault. Plutarch says, “But when Pompey noticed their preparations, he hesitated to risk battle in 
the dark, and thought it necessary only to surround them… Pompey’s oldest officers, however, 
by entreating and encouraging him, persuaded him to attack at once; for it was not completely 
dark, for the moon… still gave enough light to discern advantage. For the Romans were 
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attacking with the moon at their backs...”  Here we see a Pompey very different from the brash 63
general who fought against Sertorius years before. He’s cautious, wants to take his time, and 
surround/strangle his enemy until an opportunity presents itself. Even more importantly, Pompey 
allows his own decision to be overruled by those around him. Plutarch does not mention whether 
Pompey disliked his officers’ plan, but the similarities to the events that unfurled during the Civil 
War cannot be ignored. Pompey gives in to those around him, despite his own gut feeling. He is 
showing the extreme caution that would characterize his approach to the Civil War years later. 
While Plutarch does tend to employ narrative dramatization, Dio’s account also makes 
mention of Pompey’s decision to attack at night that indicates some level of unwillingness to do 
so. Dio says: “Then, knowing that they were about to escape, he was compelled to fight by 
night.”  Given Plutarch’s telling of the events, it is tempting to think that Pompey was 64
compelled by his officers, but it is also equally likely that Dio means Pompey was urged on by 
the situation. Whatever the case, both Plutarch and Dio agree that Pompey’s forces attacked 
Mithridates’ at night with the moon on their backs, taking their enemy by surprise and winning a 
decisive victory, killing around 10,000 of Mithridates’ troops.  Mithridates was able to escape 65
once again with 3,000-4,000 troops following him, meaning the chase was still on.   66
Mithridates continued his flight into Armenia, hoping to find refuge with his ally 
Tigranes II. Unfortunately for the king of Pontus, Tigranes turned him away, most likely because 
of the internal conflicts occurring in his kingdom. Tigranes’ son, Tigranes III, had rebelled 
against his father, and if Dio is to be believed, Tigranes suspected that Mithridates had been 
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giving his rebellious son support.  Additionally, Tigranes may have believed that Mithridates’ 67
war against Pompey was a lost cause, especially considering his recent devastating defeat at the 
hands of the Roman general.  All of this led to Tigranes’ refusal to help the king of Pontus, and 68
things surely looked bleak for Mithridates. Luckily for him, he still had holdings in Crimea, and 
although Pompey controlled the sea, he could still make the lengthy journey north by land.  This 69
is the course of action that he decided to take, and while Pompey pursued him initially, he 
eventually gave up to continue his conquest and stabilization of the region.  
The tumultuous relationship between Tigranes and his son could not have been better for 
Pompey. King Phraates of Parthia, Pompey’s ally, had been laying siege to the elder Tigranes 
alongside Tigranes III, but gave up after numerous failed attempted to take the King of 
Armenia’s stronghold.  Without Phraates’ help, the younger Tigranes was left alone and 70
desperately seeking a new ally, in which he found Pompey. By allying himself with the 
rebellious Tigranes III, Pompey was able to frighten the elder Tigranes into peace talks. Tigranes 
feared the power of Pompey the Great, and did not wish to shed blood against a foe he was sure 
to lose to. Velleius relates to us, somewhat dramatically, that, “... Tigranes declared that there 
was no man other than Pompey… to whose authority he would have committed himself…”  71
Tigranes II had once been one of, if not the strongest, king in the region, but now he had become 
Pompey’s suppliant. Pompey’s military strength and reputation truly carried him far.  
Pompey gave his terms to king Tigranes as thus: “...the rest of his losses were attributable 
to Lucullus, who had dispossessed him of Syria, Phoenicia, Cilica, Galatia, and Sophene; but all 
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that he had preserved until that time he should keep…”  Additionally, Tigranes had to pay a 72
sum of money to the Romans as reparation and make his son king of Sophene (today eastern 
Turkey). King Tigranes accepted Pompey’s terms, and Rome’s borders were made official. 
Pompey had so far been extremely successful stabilizing the region and establishing Roman 
hegemony.  
 
There was still plenty of work to do, however. Mithridates was still out there trying to 
rebuild his forces, and there were still those hostile to Rome either out of anxiety over Rome’s 
renewed presence in the region. One such person was Oroeses, king of of the Albanians. Oroeses 
was (rightfully) fearful that the Romans were going to invade his country, and thought a 
preemptive strike was necessary.  In the winter months of the year 66 B.C.E., Pompey had split 73
up his army into three groups, each in their own encampments waiting out the winter. Oroeses 
thought that this would be the perfect time to attack, as Pompey’s forces were split up and 
unprepared for an assault. Oroeses split up his own army (which Plutarch claims was 40,000 
strong) and attacked all three camps simultaneously, hoping to prevent the Romans from coming 
to each other’s assistance.  Unfortunately for Oroeses, all three of his separate assaults failed. 74
Pompeys officers were able to skillfully repel the attacking Albanians, while Pompey, having 
learned of the attack, sauntered out of his own camp and surprised the regiment designated to 
attack him.  With his assault having failed, Oroeses capitulated to Pompey, and the two signed a 75
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peace treaty for the time being. Another hostile eastern kingdom had been defeated thanks to 
Pompey’s skills as a general. 
Pompey’s next enemy was the Iberians in modern day central Georgia, west of where 
Pompey had fought the Albanians. Like Oroeses, King Atroces of the Iberians feared Pompey, 
and believed that he was next on Pompey’s list of conquests.  Thus, he began to prepare his own 76
forces to preemptively strike Pompey before he could reorganize after resting in his winter 
quarters, and sent envoys to the Roman general under the pretense of peace to delay him further. 
Pompey recognized this trick, and in turn invaded the Iberians, making Atroces the one that was 
unprepared. Hearing of Pompey’s advance, Atroces quickly began to flee with his army, as 
Pompey fought his way through Iberian territory after him. Eventually, Pompey caught up to the 
Iberian king at the Pelorus river (showing the speed at which he was able to move his army), and 
was able to bring a swift defeat to Atroces’ troops by rushing the kings bowmen before he could 
make use of them.  Atroces capitulation came soon after this defeat, and another of Rome’s 77
enemies had been defeated by the Roman Alexander.  
Pompey now marched west and invaded Colchis, intending to follow the path of 
Mithridates, who Pompey still needed to capture/kill to complete his task set for him by the 
senate.  However, looking over his options, Pompey decided against marching up towards 78
Crimea. There were quite a few reasons that explain Pompey’s decision. The terrain itself was 
rather mountainous and was inhabited by numerous hostile tribes. Travelling by sea also posed 
its own risks, as there were few harbors in the region.  Making the trek there would put his men 79
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at risk for a problem that had a much easier solution. Pompey still had control over the sea, and 
the Crimean peninsula could be easily blockaded, trapping Mithridates where he was. This was 
choice that Pompey inevitably made, saving both time and effort. Pompey no longer charged 
blindly ahead like he did against Sertorius in their first encounters. He now approached the risks 
presented to him with caution, and weighed whether or not the risk was worth the reward.  
To further encourage Pompey to turn back and give up his pursuit of Mithridates, the 
Albanians had broken the truce they had just recently signed and were now in open revolt.  80
Pompey now had to return to the Albanians’ territory to once more secure Rome’s hegemony in 
the region. He decided to go south into Lesser Armenia and loop back around into Albania. 
Plutarch claims that when Pompey reached the Cyrnus river, he encountered palisades placed 
along the riverbank, though Dio makes no mention of this and instead says Pompey met no 
resistance.   Pompey continued his march into Armenia and crossed the Abas river, where he 81
learned that the Oroeses was approaching. Pompey needed to find a way to bait Oroeses for, as 
had been the case so far, upon seeing the size of Pompey’s army Oroeses would be sure to flee. 
Thus, he came up with the following, rather clever, solution: “Accordingly, he marshalled his 
cavalry in front… and he kept the rest behind them in a kneeling position and covered with their 
shields… so that Oroeses should not ascertain their presence until he came to close quarters.”  82
The plan worked perfectly, and Albania once again had to sign a truce with Pompey. 
Pompey’s success in the region did not go unnoticed; it was clear to see that the Roman 
was a general beyond approach and whose ire should be avoided at all costs. Thus, the king of 
Parthia, Phraates, sent envoys to Pompey, hoping to renew their alliance and secure his 
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kingdoms safety. Instead, Pompey demanded the return the of the Gordyene territory (which lies 
north-east of Syria), and sent one of his officers to take it through force. On this, Dio gives an 
interesting look at Pompey’s character: “This was the treatment which Pompey in the fullness of 
his power accorded to Phraates, thereby indicating very clearly to those desiring to indulge their 
greed that everything depends on armed force, and that he who is victorious by its aid wind 
inevitably the right to lay down whatever laws he pleases.”  This quote can be used to describe 83
how Pompey approached diplomatic and political situations. He relied on his reputation and 
success as a general, and when that did not work, the presence of his army or his other 
supporters/allies usually helped him get the job done. Phraates was no different, as Pompey 
commanded respect from someone that he believed he no longer needed (seeing as how his 
enemies had mostly been subdued). Pompey was effective at this type of power politics, it was 
just when he did not have the power of his army backing him that he floundered. 
Pompey’s next campaign was the conquest of Syria. While Mithridates was still 
technically on the loose, Pompey established a type of courier system to quickly send 
information if Mithridates showed any sign of leaving his position in Crimea. Pompey’s 
reasoning for conquering Syria is contested, but it is fair to say that it was a mixture of “desire 
and zeal” and to reestablish stability in the area (for Syria had recently gotten rid of its kings and 
were experiencing a form of power vacuum).  From Syria, he also went to Judea to settle the 84
war occurring there and establish a Roman presence in the region. The real reason that Pompey’s 
conquest of Syria and Judea is so important is because of what Mithridates was doing at this 
time. With Pompey so far off, Mithridates began to make plans to leave Crimea and make a 
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move against the Romans.  Unfortunately for him, in his time away from Pontus he had 85
neglected his relationships with those closest to him, most notably his son Pharnaces. Pharnaces 
rebelled against his father, and while what actually happened is up for debate, we do know that 
Mithridates died, either by his son’s hand or his own.   86
With the death of Mithridates came the end of Pompey’s conquests. Pompey had added a 
significant portion of land to Rome’s eastern frontier, installed friendly leaders in neighboring 
kingdoms, and deterred anyone else through force from disrupting the peace he had created in 
the region. With no further need of military conquest, Pompey set about governing the region 
and making sure that his feats would not be undone so quickly. As Greenhalgh explains:  
“...Pompey’s organization of the East was no mere tying-up of loose ends from a patchwork of 
military adventures designed for self-glorification at the expense of the achievements of other 
generals whom he superseded. It was the culmination of a carefully planned and coherent exercise 
in empire-building which not only acquired the three new provinces of Pontus, Cilicia and Syria 
but also stabilized Rome’s interests through the far greater area which had fallen under the sway of 
Kings Mithridates and Tigranes at the height of their powers.”  87
 
Pompey was ensuring that the glory that he had earned would not be forgotten. If the region 
broke down shortly after Pompey’s departure, the East would no longer be the monument to 
Pompey’s achievements like he wanted it to be. For Pompey thrived on his military successes to 
fuel his life in Rome, for it had been his success as a general that had gotten him to where he 
was.  
Pompey now returned home in the year 62 B.C.E. to receive his third triumph. By the end 
of his time in the East, Pompey’s accomplishments were staggering. He had helped Sulla to 
defeat the Marians in Italy and Africa. He had been to both the western and eastern edges of 
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Rome, pushing its borders even farther and subduing its enemies. He had even cleansed the 
Mediterranean of its pirate problem, allowing for greater access to trade for the Romans and 
making it safe once again to be near the sea. Pompey’s name was known throughout Rome, and 
was both respected and feared by his colleagues. Indeed, anyone with that kind of track record 
and public support would be a danger to the carefully constructed oligarchy that the optimates 
had created. Unfortunately for Pompey, he no longer had the luxury of living the high life as his 
weaknesses as a politician truly began to come to light. Plutarch says it best, “And how well it 
would have been for him had he ended his life at that point, while he still enjoyed the good 
fortune of Alexander! For the years that followed brought him only successes that excited envy, 
or failures too great to be remedied.  88
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Chapter 3: The (not so) Triumphant Retirement 
Pompey came back to a very anxious Rome. While Pompey’s achievements were truly 
worth celebrating, his return to Italy was marred by the precedent set by recent previous Roman 
generals, namely Sulla. Many feared that Pompey would return with his army and seize control 
of Rome, and the fear was not completely unfounded. The powers that had been granted to him 
to fight the pirates and later Mithridates were enormous, and whether Pompey would willingly 
give those up was unknown. Pompey surprised all however when he disbanded his army 
immediately after landing in Italy. Dio gives Pompey’s decision high praise, calling it “...a deed 
forever worthy of admiration”.  While his decision was certainly admirable, it is also important 89
to note that Pompey was throwing away one of, if not his greatest asset. Pompey was most 
successful getting people to do what he wanted when he had an army at his back. Now it was just 
Pompey, and he needed to rely on his own merits, or that of his allies, to get what he desired.  
Once back in Rome, Pompey set about achieving three things: “... a triumph, a grant of 
land for his veteran troops, and the ratification of his arrangements in the East.”  Before he 90
could achieve this, he found a senate embroiled in somewhat petty controversy and unwilling to 
give Pompey’s requests the attention he believed they deserved. If Cicero is to be believed, 
Pompey’s first public speech after his return to Rome was a complete failure. Cicero claims that 
Pompey failed to please anybody in his speech. He also reports that Pompey seemed agitated 
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when Crassus stole his moment during a senate meeting.  Both of these events, if not 91
embellished, show a Pompey already off to a rough start and struggling to adapt to a world in 
which he is not in complete control. 
Pompey quickly realized that, to get what he wanted, he needed to get men loyal to him 
elected consuls. He chose Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer and Lucius Afranius, who both 
ended up winning the election after Pompey threw all his weight behind them (especially 
Afranius).  Pompey was able to celebrate his triumph, and now set about accomplishing his 92
other two requests. However, he met fierce opposition from the optimates, who stopped him at 
every turn, and Pompey quickly learned he had backed the wrong people for consul. Metellus 
ended up betraying Pompey (which Pompey should have seen coming as Pompey had divorced 
his sister), and joined with the optimates to oppose him.  Afranius, while a loyal soldier, turned 93
out to be an awful politician an unable to help Pompey.  While Pompey did not have complete 94
control over the decisions and abilities of his picks for consul, he should have at least thought 
about the potential ramifications of his divorce or the limitations of Afranius.  
 The optimates in the senate postponed the vote to ratify Pompey’s arrangements in the 
East, deciding that they needed further investigation before being voted on.  Furthermore, they 95
shot down Pompey’s land proposal, arguing fiercely against it. With so much hostility against 
him, Pompey needed someone in his court. This came in the form of tribune by the name of 
Lucius Flavius, but he too would prove to be a poor choice. During a heated exchange over one 
91 Cicero, ​Letters to Atticus ​1.14 
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of Pompey’s proposals, Flavius had Metellus arrested.  This could not have been worse for 96
Pompey. He had disbanded his army so as to dispel fears that he would take Rome by force, and 
now his own supporter had imprisoned one of his opponents. Pompey called Flavius off, and 
tried to convince everyone that he had done so at Metellus’ request, but this too failed miserably 
and nobody believed him. 
Pompey had been faced with failure after failure since returning to Rome. It does not 
seem unlikely that by this point, Pompey must have been feeling some type of nostalgia for his 
time as a general. Then, his greatest tool was his army, an always reliable way of getting people 
to do what he wanted, especially when he was leading it. Now, Pompey seemed to be 
continuously floundering. From failed speeches to horrible choices in political allies, all of 
Pompey’s plans were falling through. Thus, it is no surprise that Dio reports that Pompey, in 
exclamation towards his enemies, “...declared that they were jealous of him and that he would 
make this clear to the plebs. Fearing, however, that he might fail of their support also… he 
abandoned his demands.”  His return home, upon closer inspection, was less than a triumphant 97
one.  
Pompey was eventually able to return to his demands and get them approved, but this 
came after his joining of the First Triumvirate with Caesar and Crassus. There is some 
disagreement amongst more modern historians about who actually put the alliance into motion. I 
decide to follow the sequence of events as presented by historians like Philip Freeman, that 
believe Caesar was the one who orchestrated it. Upon reviewing Pompey’s political floundering, 
it is hard to believe that he would be able to create an alliance of such magnitude. It supposes 
96 Ibid., 37.50.2 
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that Pompey and Crassus were both able to put their rivalry aside without Caesar’s intervention. 
Furthermore, we then must believe that Pompey and Crassus had kept their alliance a secret for 
some time, until officially announcing it with Caesar, and that the accounts by ancient historians 
like Plutarch and Dio are wrong.  While there is some plausibility to the claim that Pompey 98
formed the alliance himself, it seems unlikely. It seems much more probable that Caesar put 
everything together (especially considering his own skills as an orator), and that his proposal 
truly saved Pompey’s political aspirations. Pompey was able to accomplish what he wanted, but 
only after Caesar stepped into the picture to help.  
Pompey did not just fail on the senate floor, he also failed when trying to court the public. 
In a letter from Cicero, we learn of a gladiatorial event hosted by Pompey (most likely in attempt 
to win favor with the people). He describes the event as being rather mundane, with nothing new 
or exciting of mention. That is until the final day of the event, in which Pompey brought out 
elephants to fight. If Pompey hoped to impress the crowd with the exotic animals, he was sorely 
mistaken as it had the complete opposite effect. Cicero reports that there was no enjoyment in the 
crowd, and many felt some level of compassion towards the creatures as they watched the games 
unfurl.  It echoes the first speech he gave after returning to Rome, as he once again failed to 99
create a buzz around him.  
Pompey’s return to Rome and Roman politics was plagued with failure. He consistently 
showed his inability to read a crowd and drum up support for his causes. Pompey was not 
completely inept at giving speeches though. He gave quite a popular speech at a popular 
assembly in support of a land bill proposed by Caesar. However, it would seem as though 
98 ​Greenhalgh, ​Pompey The Roman​, 199. 
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Pompey was being used as a tool for advancement by Caesar, and the excitement in the crowd 
can easily be attributed to Caesar’s own speech beforehand.  While a great military leader, 100
Pompey found himself struggling to survive in Rome without his army. His military 
achievements carried him far, but they meant nothing to the optimates that now stood against 
him.  
Pompey continued to support Caesar for years to come, until things began to break down 
as the Civil War approached. There are a myriad reasons why: Pompey’s wife/Caesar’s daughter 
died, the death of Crassus, and Pompey’s jealousy over Caesar’s success in Gaul. With this stake 
driven between the two, the optimates stepped in to sink their claws into the Roman Alexander, 
now using him as their own instrument like Caesar had done for years. Pompey proved himself 
to be an extremely capable general, on par with Caesar. But the difference between the two in 
terms of political ability becomes apparent when we look at Caesar’s life as a whole. 
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Part 2 
Chapter 4: The Formation of an Upstart 
The biographies written by Suetonius and Plutarch on Caesar are both damaged in the 101
beginning, leaving us with his birthdate and around 16 years missing. Therefore, whatever may 
have happened during those 16 years must be extrapolated based on the information we have on 
Caesar and Roman life. Since Caesar was born into a patrician family (like Pompey), he most 
likely became familiar early on with political life. Caesar’s father experienced moderate success 
as a politician, and as Roman tradition would dictate, Caesar would most likely have started 
accompanying his father, also named Julius, at a very early age to become acquainted with the 
politics of Rome.  However, while his family may have technically been a part of the 102
aristocracy and participated in politics, Caesar’s class origins did not reflect this. Caesar’s family 
lived in the Subura neighborhood of Rome, which, “...was a lower-class neighborhood in a small 
valley known for tradesmen, prostitutes, and foreign residents.”  Growing up, Caesar would 103
have had a lot of contact with the plebeian population of Rome, which may have played a very 
large factor later on in his political leanings.  
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It can be assumed that Caesar grew up with a sense of self importance and high 
ambitions. Being born into a patrician family already put him above the majority of Roman 
citizens (even if he did live among them), and accompanying his father would have given him 
some level of pride as he would have been among the nation’s elite. Furthermore, Caesar’s 
position in his family would have contributed to his feelings of enhanced self worth as well. 
Amongst his siblings, Caesar was the only son, thus he would be expected to take over as the 
paterfamilias ​ (the head of the household) after his father passed.  From a very early age, Caesar 104
would have been aware of the fact that he was to become a leader in not only his household but 
also his country.  
While Caesar would have spent more time with his father as he matured, the role of his 
mother cannot be overlooked in shaping the young Caesar into an ambitious upstart. While the 
Julian family had fallen on hard times, members of the family had been able to marry powerful 
figures, and such was the case with Caesar’s father. The senior Caesar married a woman by the 
name of Aurelia who came from the Cotta family (a noble plebeian line).  “Aurelia was 105
cultured, highly intelligent, and absolutely devoted to the welfare and career of her son.”  106
Aurelia would clearly play an important role in Caesar’s upbringing, and is even mentioned by 
Tacitus as being a prime example of motherhood.  Caesar very clearly was set up from the start 107
as an upstart. His lineage allowed him to enter into the upper echelons of Roman politics, while 
his mother’s background as well as the location of his childhood home made sure that he was in 
constant contact with the plebeian majority.  
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The first major event in Caesar’s life was the defeat of the populare movement led by 
Cinna and Marius by Sulla. The Julii had been able to secure some powerful marriages to try and 
help elevate themselves from their impoverished situation. Of these two marriages (the other 
being Caesar’s father and mother), the marriage of Caesar’s aunt Julia to Marius was the more 
important for the family as a whole. Marius was a powerful and influential general and marrying 
him would bring notoriety to Caesar’s family. Of course, Marius’ success did not help him in the 
end as Sulla and the optimates defeated his populare movement. 
When Sulla controlled Rome, he set upon eliminating any who had supported or had 
connection with Marius and the movement. Due to Caesar’s familial relationship with Marius, 
this now made him a potential target for the new dictator of Rome. Oddly enough however, 
Sulla’s first action against Caesar was not to have him killed. He first attempted to “entice or 
intimidate” Caesar into divorcing his wife Cornelia (the daughter of Marius’ co-conspirator 
Cinna).  Even stranger was Caesar’s decision to reject Sulla’s demands. Caesar had not been 108
the first that Sulla had ordered to cut marriage relations; as mentioned earlier Pompey too, had 
been asked to divorce his wife (to which he had quickly complied). Caesar’s decision to stay 
with Cornelia is characteristic of him as it shows his unwillingness to back down, especially to 
an optimate such as Sulla. After this, Sulla wanted Caesar dead, to which many in Sulla’s own 
party found puzzling, and argued against such an action.   109
Both Plutarch and Suetonius cite Sulla in a fairly prophetic way, though Suetonius’ 
writings are much more foreshadowing than Plutarch’s: “Have your way and take him; only bear 
108 Plutarch, ​Caesar ​1.1 
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in mind that the man you are so eager to save will one day deal the death blow to the cause of the 
aristocracy, which you have joined with me in upholding; for in this Caesar there is more than 
one Marius,”  While this may have simply been a myth, it is possible that Sulla did indeed see 110
the potential that was within the young patrician. Caesar would go into hiding until Sulla was 111
convinced to let Caesar live, after which Caesar decided to join the military at the age of 19 and 
served his first campaign in Asia.  Caesar’s enlistment was probably an attempt to put as much 112
distance between himself and Sulla as possible, meaning that Sulla was responsible for the 
beginning of Caesar’s military career. Even early on his life, Caesar was showing his 
stubbornness and unwillingness to bend to his enemies. 
After these events, Caesar began his climb up the Path of Honors (essentially the ladder 
of Roman politics), at the top of which lied the coveted position of consul. During this time, 
Caesar would prove himself as an orator such as when he prosecuted the ex-consul Cornelius 
Dolabella.  It is unknown what exactly Caesar did on the first step of the Path of Honors (the 113
position of military tribune). It is theorised however (by historians such as Philip Freeman) that 
he served under Marcus Crassus against the slave revolt led by Spartacus, which would explain 
why Caesar became such a staunch supporter of his future co-member of the Triumvirate.  114
During his time as Quaestor (the second step on the Path of Honors), Caesar was sent to Farther 
Spain. On his way back from Spain, Caesar established friendships with many Romans in the 
north of Italy. “This move would again pay enormous dividends in the following decade,” says 
Philip Freeman, “when he recruited thousands of soldiers from this region for his war in Gaul 
110 Ibid. 
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and his subsequent revolution.”  Continuing with his populist approach, as Aedile Caesar 115
decorated a plethora of buildings and held gladiatorial events and plays. The result being that 
Caesar won the admiration of the masses in Rome.  On the final step before consul, Caesar 116
spent his time by attacking the optimates in the senate and firmly stomping out any who tried to 
connect himself to Catiline’s conspiracy (scaring away any who might try and oppose him in the 
process).  Caesar’s time spent advancing along the Path of Honors may not have afforded him 117
much military experience, but it was still essential foundation for his later years. He proved 
himself to be a firm populare and a politician capable of achieving what he set out to do.  
 
After Caesar’s term as praetor, he returned to Spain, this time as the governor of the 
province. Cassius Dio tells of a Caesar apiring for glory and reaching for a place among the great 
generals of Rome.  Upon arriving, Caesar raised another legion to add to the two he already had 118
waiting for him.  First, he set upon the Lusitani by ordering them to vacate their homes, and, 119
knowing they would refuse, allowed him the opportunity to subjugate them. He marched to war 
against the Lusitani and met them on the battlefield. The Lusitani sent their herds before their 
troops, expecting Caesar’s men to give chase to the animals and give them the opportunity to 
attack the occupied Romans.  However, Caesar was not like the Roman generals the Lusitani 120
had encountered and defeated before. Caesar paid little attention to the animals and pressed his 
men onwards, dispatching of the Lusitani army and forcing them into a retreat.  Caesar shows 121
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great control in this engagement, exemplifying his ability to lead and coordinate his men, as they 
easily could have broke rank and given chase to the Lusitani’s herd. Caesar chased the Lusitani 
to an island off the Atlantic Coast of Iberia. After one failed attempt to take the island, Caesar 
had a fleet prepared and took the island from the malnourished Lusitani.  Caesar then took this 122
newly formed navy and conquered the Callaici (who lied in the northwest corner of Spain). By 
accomplishing this, Caesar had conquered a fairly large swath of territory for Rome. He had 
come to Spain in hopes of finding glory and he had achieved that, surprising his enemies with 
unexpected tactics. Caesar next set his eyes towards Rome and taking the final step on the Path 
of Honors.  
Caesar quickly returned to Rome, ready to receive a triumph and run for his first 
consulship. However, Caesar quickly faced a difficult choice brought upon by the fickleness of 
Roman law and a clever opponent in the senate. To run for consul, Caesar would have to enter 
Rome as a private citizen, and he could not do this if he received his triumph (as he would be 
entering as a general).  While he petitioned the senate to allow him to run even though he was 123
absent from the city, Cato (an optimate and critic of Caesar) was able to filibuster the vote on 
Caesar’s proposition.  While this was surely frustrating for Caesar, it would not have been the 124
end of the world. Consuls only served one year, after which Caesar would be able to run for the 
office. This seemed like the clear choice, as a triumph would have surely brought Caesar plenty 
of personal glory and prestige. However, as was common with Caesar, he did not make the 
obvious choice. He instead decided to forego his triumph and run for the consulship. While Dio 
does say that Caesar forfeited the triumph expecting more to come his way in the future, his 
122 Ibid., 37.53.4 
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decision to run for consul shows his conviction and unwillingness to give into his political 
opponents as well as his tendency to take the least expected course of action. 
 Caesar was able to secure the consulship by patching up relations and forming an 
alliance with two of Rome’s most powerful men: Marcus Crassus and Pompey. The three had 
agreed, according to Suetonius, that, “...no step should be taken in public affairs which did not 
suit any one of the three.”  Thus the First Triumvirate was born, and it ensured that, as long as 125
the three agreed, they could do just about anything they set their minds to. The gravity of this 
alliance was not lost on everyone in the senate. Cato was very critical of the Triumvirate, with 
Plutarch writing, “Cato often gave dark prophecies of what would come, and at the time all he 
won was a reputation as an ungenerous troublemaker; it was only later that people applauded 
him for his sagacious and ill-starred advice.”  While the optimates did attempt to block 126
Caesar’s power grab by backing the senator Marcus Bibulus (a fierce opponent of Caesar) in his 
bid for consulship, this plan soon backfired in epic proportions.  
Caesar’s first action as consul was to propose a new agrarian law, which Bibulus shouted 
objection to. On the day of the vote, the forum was filled with Caesar’s supporters. While 
Bibulus tried to push his way through and stand against Caesar, he was thrown to the ground, 
had his fasces broken, and his followers attacked.  Bibulus managed to escape, but his pride 127
had taken a powerful hit. During the rest of Caesar’s consulship, Bibulus would remain in his 
home and do little to stop his fellow consul. So little was Bibulus seen, that many documents 
during this time were sealed saying, “Done in the consulship of Julius and Caesar,” rather than, 
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“Bibulus and Caesar” as it should have been.  Caesar knew how to win over a crowd and to get 128
what he wanted done. His treatment of Bibulus shows that Caesar was not afraid to step on 
anyone’s toes.  
Over the course of his consulship, Caesar would pass many laws that angered the 
optimates. Thus, as the end of his consulship neared, he began to worry about potential 
prosecution brought on by his rivals in the senate. With the help of his powerful allies, Caesar 
was able to secure a proconsular governorship over the provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine 
Gaul.  This could not have been a better opportunity for Caesar, as Gaul had largely been 129
untouched by any Roman generals in recent times (with most of the more recent wars being 
focused in the east). As Pompey had conquered the east, Caesar was to conquer the west. 
Caesar’s sights were now set towards Gaul. Plutarch remarks that this was “a new start” 
and “a new path of achievement” for Caesar.  He finally had the chance to truly achieve 130
something great. Before him lied the Gauls, ancient enemies of Rome. In his early career, he 
proved himself to be a more than capable politician, and even a competent general. Now, he 
could really show what he was capable of. His achievements in Gaul would impress (and 
sometimes anger) many back in Rome, including his ally and friend, Pompey.  
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Chapter 5: Caesar in the West 
Before beginning with Caesar’s campaign in Gaul, it is important to acknowledge where 
our information is coming from. Caesar was, like all Roman generals, expected to send reports 
back to the senate on his travels and conquests. However, after Caesar had concluded his wars in 
Gaul, he published these reports as a single book (what we know as the Gallic Wars), allowing 
the average Roman citizen to read of Caesar’s escapades.  Caesar’s intentions now seem clear: 131
this was a propaganda piece that was meant to capture the minds of the public. The work itself 
does not meet the standards of what constitutes history (whether it be now or even in his own 
time); Caesar wanted to write something that could be understood by all, not something meant 
for academia.  This does not mean that the source is fictional in its entirety; much of what he 132
said has been verified through physical evidence.  However, it is important to note that when 133
Caesar is writing, he is making himself out to be the hero, as this was meant as a way to excite 
and win over the Roman people. His writing is still an excellent source and gives a look into the 
mind of Rome’s future conqueror, but the fact stands that Caesar was writing to entice the 
Roman people to his side.  
 
Caesar’s conquest into Gaul was fueled by the Romans’ fear that the German peoples 
would expand into the Gallic region and gain strength. The instability of Gaul and its many tribes 
gave Caesar the perfect excuse to invade in the name of protecting Roman interests from a 
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potential German invasion. In his own writings, Caesar shows a type of reverence for the 
strength and the threat the Germans posed. When describing the Helvetii (one of the Gallic 
peoples), Caesar says that they are one of the bravest of the Gauls due to their proximity to the 
Germans  and having to deal with “daily battles”.  Not only was Gaul the perfect avenue to 134
prove his military worth and gain power, but Caesar would be able to do so under the guise of 
protecting Rome from a larger threat. The senate of course would not want Caesar to gain power 
in any form, so by using this excuse he was able to keep his political opponents’ hands tied back 
at home.  
Caesar’s praise of the Helvetii’s bravery can be interpreted as more than just a testament 
to the ferocity of the Germans. By describing the Helvetii as such a brave and strong people, he 
is making his victory over them all the more impressive, as the first military engagement 
between Caesar and the Gauls was against the Helvetii themselves. While their near constant 
contact with the Germans may have made them formidable enemies to Caesar, they desired a 
better place in which to live. As Caesar describes, the Helvetii at this time were hampered by 
natural barriers (the Jura Mountains and the Rhone River) and the Germans across the Rhine 
which gave them little breathing room.  At this time, people among the Helvetii began to 135
discuss the possibility of  migrating west, further into Gaul. One such person was Orgetorix, a 
Helvetii nobleman who managed to convince the Helvetii to prepare for their trip west by using 
his influence and prestige.  While he may have not lived to see the migration he so desperately 136
wanted, the idea did not die with him. Orgetorix had fueled the creation of Caesar first enemy.  
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In order for the Helvetii to go west, they had two options at their disposal. They could 
take the route that went between the Rhone River and the Jura mountains (a part of the Alps), or 
they could travel through the Roman province of Ulterior Gaul.  The former, as Caesar 137
explains, was less ideal for the Helvetii to take: “... an extremely high mountain range looms 
above it, so that a tiny force could easily prevent their advance.”  Faced with this, the Helvetii 138
decided to take the route through Roman territory, thus leading to the first engagement between 
Caesar and the Helvetii.  
Caesar would not allow for an entire foreign tribe to wander through Roman territory. 
The problem however was this: there was only one  legion in the province of Ulterior Gaul. In 
order to level the numbers between him and his enemy, Caesar imposed a levy on the province.
 A Roman legion from this period contained around 4,000 to 5,000 troops.  Caesar does not 139 140
include the amount of men that he was able to gather from the levy, but whatever that number 
may have been seems to pale in comparison to what the Helvetii had. Caesar is quoted as saying 
there were 368,000 migrants, and Plutarch places the number of active combatants at 190,000.  141
Of course, this seems to be an unreasonable amount, and it was often the case that Roman 
generals would exaggerate the number of enemies killed in battle.  However, it is safe to 142
assume that Caesar was most likely outnumbered as this was still an entire tribe migration, 
especially in instances like river crossings where individual groups would be forced into tighter 
quarters.  Thus, Caesar decided to go on the defensive: “...he employed the legion he had with 143
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him….to build a wall nineteen miles long and sixteen feet high, along with a trench, all the way 
from Lake Lemannus, which flows into the Rhone River, to the Jura mountain range.”  It is 144
generally agreed upon that Caesar did not build a wall that encompassed the entire length of the 
river but instead fortified only certain areas.  This still would have created a natural bottleneck 145
at the more shallow points in the river, as this is where the Helvetii would have the best chances 
of crossing. While the Helvetii did attempt to ford the river, it ended in failure as they were 
repelled by the Roman forces stationed along the wall.  Caesar was able to use the terrain 146
around him using large manmade works (which would become somewhat characteristic of him) 
to turn a larger force into a much more manageable threat.  
Faced with this new and seemingly unsurpassable obstruction, the Helvetii decided to 
turn around and instead go through their neighbor’s land in the Jura Mountains. The Helvetii 
had managed to broker a deal with the Sequani, exchanging hostages for safe passage through 
the mountain pass.  Caesar was now in an even tighter situation than he was before. His enemy 147
still had a huge number advantage, and he no longer had the advantage of his river fortifications. 
Caesar enlisted two legions and raised three more out of their winter quarters, ready to chase 
down the Helvetii.  While he made it seem as though this was an impromptu action, there is 148
reason to doubt Caesar. It is much more likely that he had had these legions prepared before he 
knew of the Helvetii migration. Caesar also did not have the ability to raise new legions; that 
power was reserved by the senate. Therefore, these new legions were coming out of the general’s 
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own pocket; he was essentially creating his own personal army.  This of course meant that 149
these men were loyal to Caesar and not the senate, as he is the one who supplied their paychecks. 
This shows not only his independence, but also his willingness to subvert authority.  
To catch up to his enemy, Caesar did something unexpected that would show his, to 
become, famed speed. He led his men through the Alps, on paths, “...no other Roman general 
would have even considered.”  In the short time that Caesar had lead his army, he had already 150
showed them that not only did he not falter against unfavorable conditions, but he flourished. 
Caesar was already demonstrating his unpredictable nature as a general and his ability to rally his 
troops onward against disadvantageous odds.  
Due to Caesar’s unorthodox decision to pass through the Alps, he was able to catch up to 
the Helvetii as they were crossing the Sa ​ône River. It had taken the Helvetii 20 days to finish a 
makeshift bridge, and as such only three-quarters of the Helvetii had made it across the river by 
the time Caesar arrived. Caesar ordered a surprise attack against the Helvetii that had not yet 
crossed, and was easily victorious as he had struck them when they were least prepared.  151
Caesar had caught his more numerous foe while they were at their weakest, and used this 
moment of division to strike and even the odds. Caesar then built his own bridge and managed to 
cross his entire army over the river in a single day.  Caesar’s speed and his ruthlessness 152
frightened the Helvetii so much, that even though they had a numerical advantage they attempted 
to parley with him. Even against a larger force, Caesar was able to find ways to break down his 
enemy both physically and mentally.  
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The Helvetii sent their emissary Divico (who Caesar notes to have been one of the 
leaders of the Helvetii in a previous war with the Romans) to discuss terms of peace with Caesar. 
The negotiation did not go particularly well however, as the Helvetii not only threatened the 
Romans but also chastised Caesar for his use of trickery when attacking while they were crossing 
the ​Sa​ône River, and claiming that “They had learned from their fathers and forefathers to fight 
with bravery rather than cunning, and not to rely on tricks.”  What makes this passage so 153
interesting is that Caesar shows no misgivings towards the Helvetii’s insult. This is coming from 
Caesar’s own writings, so surely if he felt the need to defend his actions he could have. Caesar 
shows no remorse for his actions, signifying his willingness to use trickery to his advantage. 
With negotiations breaking down between the two, Caesar’s pursuit of the Helvetii 
continued. Due to a disloyal Aeduan ally, Caesar experienced some difficulties while following 
the Helvetii. While giving chase, the Gallic allied cavalry, a large portion of which were Aedui 
led by a man named Dumnorix, became too ambitious and engaged the Helvetii, who beat the 
larger cavalry and caused a route which started with Dumnorix and his men.  Additionally, 154
Dumnorix was implicated by his own brother Diviciacus to be inciting rebellions and blocking 
grains shipments.  As Freeman points out, “Any other Roman general would then have 155
promptly separated Dumorix’s head from his body.” Caesar would have been well within his 
right to do so.  However, not one to be conventional, Caesar instead let Dumnorix live and put 156
him under guard. Caesar knew that by killing Dumnorix, he would be creating more animosity 
between himself and the already disgruntled Aedui. Knowing that he needed their cavalry and 
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grain payments, Caesar instead made an ally out of Diviciacus by not killing his brother. Caesar 
could be cruel at times, but he also knew when to be forgiving. Compare this to Pompey, who 
divorced his ally’s relative and expected him to still be loyal. Caesar was able to take a negative 
situation and, through some clever diplomatic positioning, ease tension amongst the Aedui, and 
even get a high ranking Aeduan indebted to him.  
With his internal struggles solved, Caesar could turn back to his much more pressing 
issues. The Helvetii still greatly outnumbered him, making any direct engagement with the larger 
force an almost assured defeat. Therefore, if Caesar wanted to finally defeat the Helvetii, he 
would have to find favorable positioning to give himself and his army the upper hand. 
Opportunity presented itself when Caesar’s scouts reported to him that the Helvetii had set up 
camp at the foot of a hill fairly close to Caesar’s own encampment.  After gathering more intel 157
on the hill, Caesar sent the legate Labienus (who would serve with Caesar throughout his Gallic 
campaigns but eventually betray him and join Pompey during the Civil War) with two legions to 
establish a foothold on the hill, giving the Romans the high ground which is always an advantage 
in battle. Caesar’s plan from there was “to launch a full-scale attack” on the Helvetii in a surprise 
offensive, with Labienus’ men to engage after seeing Caesar begin the assault.  Caesar had no 158
intention of engaging the Helvetii in what they would describe as an “honorable” fashion. He 
knew that if he was to win, he needed to fight dirty and use every opportunity to his advantage.  
Sadly for Caesar, his string of bad luck continued. Labienus and his men were able to 
take the hill with no difficulties, and Caesar’s own men were in position and ready to attack. 
However, a man by the name of Publius Considius, who had been sent to scout ahead and see if 
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Labienus was in position, falsely reported back to Caesar the Helvetii had taken the hill, and not 
Labienus.  Due to this faulty information Caesar backed off from the enemy and awaited what 159
he thought was their inevitable attack. By the time he learned what happened, Caesar had missed 
his chance and the Helvetii moved on. His plan had been perfect and very likely would have seen 
a swift victory for the Romans. While Caesar himself makes no mention of whether or not 
Considius was punished for his failure, he does name him directly in his commentaries. This 
ensured that not only was Considius’ shame known by many, but also that Caesar was not to 
blame for the misstep.  A smart move political move sure to prevent any doubt of his abilities. 160
With this setback, Caesar’s supplies were beginning to run low, so he gave up pursuing 
the Helvetii for a while to replenish at the Aeduan town of Bibracte. The Helvetii saw this, and 
gave chase to Caesar as they saw their chance to end the Roman harassment. Knowing he had 
little time to prepare, Caesar sent forth his cavalry to stall the advancing enemy while he set up 
his men on higher ground.  A large portion of the cavalry was made up of allied Aedui, as was 161
customary for Roman cavalry to primarily be comprised of allies at this time. Their stalling of 
the Helvetii proved instrumental in giving Caesar time to take the high ground, so his choice to 
spare Dumnorix and ease tension with the Aedui proved to be crucial.  
With his army set up on the hill, Caesar had his horse sent away so he could fight on foot 
with his men, saying that, “...he wished to make the danger equal for all and take away any hope 
of flight.” and urged them on to victory.  Plutarch quotes Caesar saying, “‘I shall use that later,’ 162
he said, ‘for the pursuit, when I have won. For the moment, let us attack the enemy.’”  The 163
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battle began as the Helvetii, confident in their own abilities, charged uphill towards the romans 
in phalanx formation. Throwing their javelins, the Roman soldiers quickly broke the enemy 
phalanx, and charged forward, swords in hand. The heavy javelins insured that many of the 
Helvetii fought with no shield, as they were weighed down with the Roman pila.  With their 164
formation shattered, the Helvetii began to retreat and the Romans gave chase. However, Helvetii 
reinforcements attacked Caesar on his exposed flank from behind, forcing the Romans to fight in 
two directions. While the fighting was, “long and bitterly contested,” and continued on into the 
night, the Roman force was able to defeat the Helvetii and seize their baggage train.  While the 165
battle of Bibracte may not have been the most complex in terms of strategy, it does show 
Caesar’s ability to control his army and his soldiers’ discipline. Fighting on two fronts is never 
optimal, but Caesar and his men were able to turn a potentially disastrous situation into a victory. 
After their defeat, seeing no other option, the Helvetii once again sent emissaries to 
discuss surrender. Caesar’s terms were simple: the Helvetii were to return home and essentially 
serve a buffer between the Germans and Rome and stop any German incursions into Gaul.  The 166
Helvetii were essentially being forced back into the very role that they had been trying so 
desperately to flee from. Caesar had won his first major war in Gaul. By defeating the Helvetii, 
he not only shored up defences against the Germans, but he had also proven himself to be an 
effective commander in large engagements (as his only experience prior had been smaller battles 
in Spain).  
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Caesar’s next opponent in Gaul would not be another Gallic tribe. Instead, Caesar would 
find his legions facing off against the very people that he had so desperately been trying to keep 
at distance with the Helvetii: the Germans. Longtime allies of Rome, the Aedui had found 
themselves victorious against their rival faction, the Arverni. Seeking help, the Arverni invited 
German troops to help them with their conflict, and led the them to victory over the Aedui. 
However, once victorious, the German king Ariovistus decided to settle in the lands of the 
Sequani (one of the tribes of the Arverni faction) with his German troops, and according to 
Caesar, “...he was ruling cruelly and arrogantly.”  Caesar writes that he promised the Gauls that 167
he would help resolve this matter, and after a failed attempt at diplomacy, Caesar turned to 
military action and his next Gallic campaign.  This could not have been a better scenario for 168
Caesar. One of the main reasons that he had waged war against the Helvetii was because they 
served as a buffer between Rome and the feared German tribes. Now, he had the chance to not 
only prove himself against a German tribe, but also gain favor with his Gallic allies and increase 
the Roman presence in Gaul.  
Caesar’s first move was to occupy the town of Vesontio, north of the Jura mountains 
along the Dubis River. Quickly forcing his troops into a march, he was able to take the town 
before Ariovistus could, demonstrating his ability to traverse long stretches of land rapidly.  169
Caesar goes into detail about the strategic positioning of the settlement, such as how it was 
mostly surrounded by the Dubis River, making it easily defensible.  Anyone attempting to lay 170
siege to the town would have to cross the river (such as when the Helvetii attempted to cross the 
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Rhône), or cross over the small strip of land into the town, which was naturally fortified by a hill. 
Caesar now had what was essentially a natural fortress with plenty of supplies. 
The next step was invigorating his troops to fight the Germans. Many soldiers were 
beginning to have second thoughts when it came to fighting against the men from across the 
Rhine. This fear quickly spread throughout the army, with some soldiers even threatening mutiny 
against Caesar if he ordered them to advance.  Any army would have difficulty engaging their 171
enemy with such low morale, as it could easily lead to a devastating early route. Caesar knew he 
needed to win back his army, so he gathered his lieutenants together, and after giving a lengthy 
speech, told the men:  
 
“Do you, then, look at matters in this light yourselves, and also instruct the rest. For that matter, 
even if some of you do feel differently, I, for my part, will fight just the same and will never 
abandon the post to which I have been assigned by my country. The tenth legion will be enough 
for me; I am sure that... they would readily go through fire naked. The rest of you be off, the 
quicker the better, and let me not see you wearing yourselves out here to no purpose… 
appropriating the plunder gathered by others.”  172
 
Surrounded by men telling him to not engage, Caesar stood defiantly against them. His actions 
contrast heavily with Pompey, who had faced a similar scenario under his father’s command. His 
words roused the Roman soldiers, quickly snapping them out of their fear. Caesar showed his 
abilities as an orator and was able to to persuade those around him.  
With his army’s loyalty firmly secured, they set off towards Ariovistus. The fast 
approach of the Romans alarmed the German king, and he quickly called for further peace talks.
 However, just as before, the chance at a diplomatic solution quickly fell apart as German 173
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horsemen began harassing Romans soldiers.  The two opposing armies returned to their camps, 174
and proceeded to carry out a long stalemate. Caesar would move his troops out, but the Germans 
seemed intent on not engaging in a decisive battle, preferring smaller skirmishes. Caesar gives 
the following reason for the Germans reluctance: “...it was customary among the Germans for 
the mothers of families to cast sacred lots and practice divination before declaring whether or not 
it was advantageous to join battle. On this occasion they had said that it was not the will of fate 
for the Germans to win if they fought a battle before the new moon.”  The Romans now had the 175
upper hand, as the German troops were hesitant to fight in a battle they thought they were fated 
to lose. With this information, Caesar knew now was the time to press the attack. The tides had 
turned: it was now the Germans who were afraid to fight the Romans. 
Caesar deployed his men into a triple battle line and marched close to the German 
encampment. This provoked the Germans, and they marched out to meet the Roman legions on 
the battlefield. It is odd that Ariovistus decided to engage the them, especially due to the ill 
omens he had received, though Plutarch sums it up as simple rage.  Marching out in front of the 176
enemy camp did not come without its downsides, however, as the proximity to the enemy made 
it impossible for the Roman soldiers to launch their javelins at the Germans before engaging.  177
While not an optimal situation (and perhaps even an oversight on Caesar’s part), the battle still 
went in the favor of the Romans, as the German phalanxes were overcome by the fierce Roman 
soldiers. The whole of the German army was routed off, and sent back over the Rhine into 
Germany. Caesar had managed to once again overcome staggering odds. He kept control of his 
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army in face of a terrifying foe, while also recognizing and attacking the German when they 
were at their lowest. Caesar knew the importance psychology played in warfare. He had made 
sure that his own troops were eager and ready to fight, and attacked the enemy when they already 
believed they would lose.  
Caesar had now defeated two rather large threats in Gaul. Additionally, he had done it in 
a very short period of time, with both the defeat of the Helvetii and the Germans occurring in just 
one summer.  If there were any who had doubted Caesar’s abilities before, they were surely 178
rethinking their stance now. The northern Roman borders were now secure and the German 
threat subdued. However, the next threat would not come from Germany, as Caesar once again 
found himself facing off against Gallic tribes.  
 
Over the winter, Caesar allowed his legions to rest in Gaul after their successful 
campaigns against the Helvetii and the Germans. During this time, he began to receive reports 
that the Belgae (who resided in the north of modern day France) were conspiring against Rome. 
Caesar lists the reasons for their discontent as follows: “...first of all, the Belgae were afraid that 
after the pacification of all Gaul, they would be the next target of our army. Second, they were 
being approached by a number of Gauls, some of whom, though they did not want any more 
German involvement in Gaul, were no less annoyed that an army of the Roman people should 
stay through the winter and become established there. There were also those whose sheer 
fickleness and lack of constancy induced them to aim at a shift of power.”  If Caesar thought 179
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his stay in the Gallic region had gone unnoticed he was sorely mistaken. The Gallic tribes were 
beginning to view his actions in Gaul with apprehension.  
The rebellious Roman general, in response to these reports, enlisted another two legions 
without the senate’s consent and set off towards the Belgae.  According to Caesar, he travelled 180
from Cisalpine Gaul to the borders of the Belgae in around 15 days, once again frightening his 
enemy with his speed.  His quick arrival was a great advantage, as the Belgic tribes had not yet 181
consolidated their forces. The largest of these tribes was the Bellovaci, who had pledged 60,000 
troops to fight against Rome, making them the greatest threat. In order to divert the Bellovaci 
from joining the rest of the Belgic tribes, Diviciacus was sent with the rest of the Aedui to 
destroy the Bellovaci farmland.  Dividing the enemy would make future engagements more 182
manageable, and destroying the farmland of one of the largest Belgic tribes was sure to damage 
the enemy’s supplies.  
While their initial strategy was sound and saw early success, the Belgae began to fall 
apart once they began to face the Roman soldiers. Caesar made camp on a hill near the Aisne 
river, “...looking down on a swampy stream to his north, through which the Belgae would have 
to approach if they wanted to attack.”  The Belgic tribes knew that attacking the Romans on 183
their own terms would be foolish, so they instead attempted to bait them out. The Belgae laid 
siege upon the nearby Roman allied town of Bibrax, and saw much success, with the town’s 
commander quickly asking for help from the Roman army. The enemy still had a much larger 
force, so fighting without the advantage of the fortified camp would prove difficult. However, 
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Caesar did not intend to simply hand the town over to his enemy. He sent forth his light troops, 
comprised of Numidians, Cretans, and Balearics and armed with bows and slings, to help fend 
off the attack.  The psychological effect that these slingers and archers had on the Belgic troops 184
should not be underestimated. These Roman allies were utilising a type of warfare not yet seen 
by Belgae, and the fear that they induced led to a quick rout. Caesar cleverly used the foreign 
fighting style to his advantage to attack the psyche of the enemy. The Belgic tribes next 
attempted to attack the Romans directly, but their attempts were easily pushed back.  
These early engagements had proven unsuccessful for the Belgae. Their next move, 
however, seemed to play directly into Caesar’s earlier strategy of dividing and conquering. The 
Belgic tribes decided it would be best to split up and to have each tribe return home. The plan 
was that, once the Romans attacked, they would rally to whosoever was invaded.  The idea was 185
that this would give the Belgae, not the Romans, the luxury of fighting on their own terms. The 
Belgic tribes quickly departed and set off towards their homelands. Realizing that his enemy was 
in flight, Caesar set off after them, and began harassing the rear guard of the enemy. Due to the 
disorganization of the Belgae, who were without a clear leader, the Roman soldiers were left 
unopposed and laid waste to many of the enemies troops.  Caesar could not have found himself 186
in a better position; his enemy was divided and in flight. Caesar had used every opportunity 
available to him and the much larger Belgic force had been beaten back at every turn. 
Following their rout, Caesar set upon the individual Belgic tribes and found them to be 
easy pickings. First were the Suessiones, who surrendered in the town of Noviodunum (near 
modern day Soissons) after becoming, “...hugely alarmed at the large scale of the siege works, 
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the likes of which they had never seen or heard of before...”  Next, Caesar set upon the 187
Bellovaci. The largest of the Belgic tribes, they had retreated to the town of Bratuspantium. 
Upon the Romans arrival, the Bellovaci surrendered and handed themselves over to Caesar.  188
With two of their allies having already surrendered, the Ambiani were quick to follow.  Things 189
could not have been going better for Caesar. He had seemingly broken the enemies morale and 
was making quick work of the separated tribes. 
Not all of the Belgae were so willing to surrender to Rome. The Nervii still stood in 
Caesar’s way of ending the Belgic conspiracy. While not as large as the Bellovaci in terms of 
manpower and land, the Nervii were still formidable in their own right as they devoted 
themselves to warfare: “...the Nervii were the toughest warriors in all of Gaul. Like the Spartans 
in ancient Greece, the Nervii prided themselves on their austerity at home and discipline in war.”
 Unlike the others, the Nervii did not stand alone; they had managed to solidify alliances with 190
the Atrebate, Viromandui, and Atuatuci tribes. The Belgae may have split up, but the Nervii had 
managed to muster up a fairly large force, again putting Caesar at a numerical disadvantage.191
The decision to retreat back to their own homeland also gave the Nervii the advantage of 
fighting on familiar ground and on their own terms. Perhaps taking inspiration from Caesar 
himself, the Nervii used the environment around them and set themselves up in the wooded 
forest across from the Sabis River. As Caesar and six of his legions were building their 
encampment, the Nervii emerged from the forest and ambushed the Romans. The only advantage 
that the Romans had was that the Nervii were charging uphill and were already tired upon 
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engaging the surprised Roman soldiers. There was no time to come up with a strategy, as the 
enemy was already upon them. Caesar, in his own words, began, “...to do everything at once...” 
and readied his men for battle.  Even with their general shouting orders and attempting to 192
organize them, the legions were still far apart from one another and far from a cohesive unit. 
This battle was to be decided more on brute strength and sheer will rather than strategy, and 
would test the mettle of Caesar’s soldiers. While some of Caesar’s men experienced success 
(such as the 9th and 10th Legions on the left wing), others were in great duress, with the entirety 
of the fourth cohort having been cut down and their standard lost.  Seeing the dire straits they 193
were in, Caesar launched himself into battle and fought side by side with his men, inspiring those 
around him.  Reinforcements soon arrived afterwards, and the tide turned in favor of the 194
Romans, leading them to victory. While the battle had been costly, Caesar had proven himself as 
a leader. With no time to prepare, Caesar and his men had been able to edge out a victory against 
a more numerous foe, speaking to the skill of his men and Caesar’s ability to control them.  
The final tribe that still defied him were the Atuatuci. Similar to the Suessiones, when 
besieged by Caesar they quickly surrendered: “They believed that the Romans did not wage war 
without divine help, since they could move forward such towering machines with so much 
speed.”  Thus, the Belgae had been defeated and Gaul subdued. The senate, recognizing 195
Caesar’s accomplishments, decreed a period of thanksgiving for fifteen days, five days more 
than Pompey had received for his defeat of Mithridates.  His achievements had been 196
recognized, and were clearly beginning to rival those of his triumvirate ally Pompey.  
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Following the defeat of the Belgae, in the year 56 BCE, Caesar found himself at war with 
the maritime tribes along the Atlantic coast, most notably the Veneti. The Veneti had become 
tired of their Roman conquerors, and desired the return of their freedom. Thus, they captured the 
Roman officers Silius and Velanius, and refused to free them unless Rome returned to the Veneti 
their hostages.  The Veneti were to be a difficult foe for they were unlike Caesar’s previous 197
enemies; they were able to flee from village to village by boat, transporting their people along to 
coast​.  ​The Veneti knew the seas and Caesar was out of his element. While the Roman general 198
did call for a fleet to be assembled, his fleet’s style of ship was unable to compete with those of 
the Veneti, as their ships were built to deal with the extreme tides along the French coast.   199
While Caesar was able to capture a number of the enemies towns, they would always flee 
on their ships, stopping the Romans from achieving a decisive victory. If there was to be any 
chance at putting an end to this war, the enemies fleet would have to be either captured or 
destroyed. While it was true that Caesar’s ships were inferior, the Roman fleet did have one trick 
up their sleeve. As Caesar recalled, “...one thing prepared by our men was of great use: 
sharp-edged hooks inserted and fasted onto long poles...They used these to grab hold of the lines 
by which the yardarms were tied to the masts and pulled them along as the Roman ship was 
driven forward by its oars, until the lines were severed. When these ropes were cut, the yardarms, 
of course, dropped, and... the ships... were at once rendered completely useless.”  With this 200
clever tactic, the Roman fleet was able to engage and defeat the Veneti. Caesar himself was not 
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onboard any of the ships during the battle. He and the rest of the army were watching from the 
coast, and he takes some credit for the bravery with which the Roman troops fought, saying that 
his mere presence made them fight harder.  While Caesar may not have been overly involved in 201
fighting the Veneti, the lessons he learned from his conflict with them would prove extremely 
helpful in the coming years. The subjugation of the Gauls along the Atlantic coast set Caesar up 
for the series of expeditions he was about to set out on. 
 
He made three expeditions during this time, his first being across the Rhine and into 
Germany. His decision to invade Germany was not entirely unwarranted, as two Germanic tribes, 
the Uipetes and Tencteri, had crossed into Gaul and attacked the Belgic tribe of the Menapii.  202
Caesar quickly responded to the reports of the German invasion and marched his army towards 
the Rhine River and his enemy. Initial attempts at finding a diplomatic resolution broke down as 
the Germans betrayed the Romans, and Caesar launched an attack on the enemies camp. Once 
again, the speed at which Caesar moved surprised his enemy. As they were unprepared, the 
Germans were quickly defeated, and many attempted to run and cross the Rhine, though they 
were either cut down by Roman troops or overcome by the current.  Caesar’s speed had once 203
again led him to victory. 
It was here, after he had defeated the invading German force, that Caesar decided it was 
time for the Romans to go on the offensive and cross into Germany. This was unheard of, as no 
Roman general prior to Caesar had ever led an army into German lands.  Of course, Caesar’s 204
201 Ibid., 3.14.8 
202 ​Ibid., 4.4.1  
203 Ibid., 4.14.2-4.15.2 
204 Suetonius, ​The Lives of the Caesars​ 1.25.2 
 
62 
reasoning for entering Germany was to ensure the safety of Rome by showing the Germans the 
strength of Republic and its armies. However, while this may be true, it was also a tremendous 
opportunity for Caesar to further solidify his name in the minds of the Roman people. For years 
the Romans had lived in fear of the Germans, so an expedition into their homeland would most 
certainly have been big news. Once he was in Germany, Caesar mainly spent his time laying 
waste to the villages and farmlands of hostile German tribes. While the Suebi tribe had prepared 
to fight, Caesar never actually engaged them, choosing instead to simply return to Gaul.  205
Caesar’s goal was not to conquer the Germans but to show them the power of the Republic, and 
that they were no longer afraid to enter their lands (as well as increasing his own fame). He knew 
that any military engagements would simply be a waste of resources and manpower, and instead 
decided to return to Gaul where he could set his sights towards his next destination. 
Caesar’s next two expeditions were both to the land of the Britons. In the same way that 
Caesar was the first Roman to lead an expedition into Germany, he was also the first to sail 
across the British Isles and set foot on the island of Britain. Unlike the Germans, the Britons 
themselves were a complete mystery to the Romans. Caesar knew so little of them, that he began 
asking Gallic merchants for information, though they were little help. He had no idea how large 
the island was, how many people inhabited it or how these people engaged in warfare.  206
Caesar’s reasoning for invading Britain was that the Britons had supplied troops to the Gauls 
during Caesar’s various conflicts with them.  Of course, as with Germany, he must have 207
realized the significance of travelling to Britain. Again Caesar was attempting to enrapture the 
minds of the Roman people. 
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Caesar’s first expedition to the land of the Britons was to be a short one, as winter was 
soon to be upon him. However, if Caesar was expecting for things to go as smoothly as they did 
in Germany, he was sorely mistaken:  
 
There were problems from the beginning. The cavalry had not yet embarked, and by the time that 
they had hastened to another port and gone aboard the eighteen transports allocated to them the 
weather had changed… Caesar consistently underestimated the power and unpredictability of the 
sea, and especially the English Channel. The cavalry transports were unable to follow.  208
 
Even though Caesar’s journey was already off to a rocky start, he was still intent on making 
landfall. Caesar’s ships once again showed their inferiority. As he was using the same fleet that 
he used against the Veneti, they were not built to anchor in shallow waters, so the Roman 
soldiers had to disembark farther off the coast. This was difficult, as they were weighed down by 
their arms and armor. To make matters worse, they were quickly set upon by the Britons’ cavalry 
and chariots.  Caesar’s men were unfamiliar with the Britons’ style of warfare, but they were 209
able to finally push the enemy back and make landfall. The hardships did not end for the 
Romans, however. During their time on Britain they saw much conflict with the Britons and their 
feared chariots and intense storms. Caesar was able to make peace with the Britons (requiring 
that they hand over hostages to the Romans), but this still came at great cost to Caesar’s army. 
Still, upon his return home, Caesar’s supporters in the senate were able to secure him another 
thanksgiving, much to the dismay and objection of the optimates, this time lasting an 
unprecedented 20 days.  While his first expedition to Britain may not have gone exactly as he 210
wanted, he was still able to achieve what he was most likely after in the first place: recognition 
for his achievements. 
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Caesar’s second trip to Britain went much better than the first. He was able to to learn 
much more about the island itself and the people that lived there, saw victory against hostile 
forces, and was able to get more hostages from the different southern tribes.  Caesar’s second 211
expedition to Britain may have been to make up for his failures the first time. His trips to 
Germany and Britain solidified his name in the minds of the Roman people. He would forever be 
remembered as the first Roman general to travel to these lands, which must have been irritating 
on some level for the glory seeking Pompey. 
 
Caesar’s conquests had taken him far. He had subjugated Gaul, crossed the Rhine, and 
been to far off Britain. However, the Gallic people still yearned for freedom, and before Caesar’s 
governorship came to an end he was to face the final attempts of the Gauls to expel the Roman 
general from their lands. A precursor to a larger uprising, a small Belgic tribe called the 
Eburones rose up against Caesar. Their leader, Ambiorix, tricked two of Caesar’s lieutenants, 
and slaughtered them and their men.  Caesar was deeply affected by the betrayal, and launched 212
a “campaign of terror” against the Eburones and all who joined them, which ended with a Roman 
victory and harsh punishment of the rebellious tribe.  If Caesar had thought his cruelty would 213
keep the Gauls in line, he was sorely mistaken. 
As Plutarch describes it, the war to come was, “...the greatest and most hazardous of all 
the Gallic Wars.”  Inspired by his fellow Gauls, Vercingetorix of the Arverni began to create 214
alliances amongst many of the Gallic tribes and his growing rebellion soon reached the ears of 
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Caesar (who had returned to Italy after his defeat of the Eburones). To delay Caesar’s arrival, 
Vercingetorix created a diversion by convincing the Gallic tribes near the Roman border to join 
his cause, creating chaos in the region and forcing Caesar to stay and restore peace.  Already 215
Vercingetorix was proving to be a greater opponent than Caesar had ever faced. 
Once things had been settled along the border, Caesar needed to reach the bulk of his 
army to the north. In a characteristic move, he made the bold decision to break through the 
Cévennes mountains and set upon the territory of the Arverni.  Caesar then set off from there 216
and met up with two of his veteran legions, and used them to capture three Gallic towns in quick 
succession (Vellaunodunum, Cenabum, and Noviodunum), using brutal force when necessary.  217
While Caesar’s early success was surely worrying for Vercingetorix, he did not give up so easily. 
He shifted strategies, and convinced many Gauls to burn down their towns and food storages in 
an effort to starve out the Romans.  Vercingetorix had seen what happened to the previous 218
Gauls who had dared to directly face Caesar, so he instead decided to attack Caesar indirectly. 
The Gallic king was willing to sacrifice everything for freedom. 
Caesar’s next move was to besiege the town of Avaricum. Here, the rebellious Gauls 
were able to witness first hand Caesar’s tricky tactics. During a rainstorm, Caesar noticed that 
the guards posted along Avaricum’s walls were placed somewhat carelessly. Always knowing to 
take advantage of an opportunity when he saw it, Caesar explains his plan: “He ordered his own 
troops to go about their work more sluggishly… Unseen under the protective siege roofs, the 
legions got ready for an attack. Caesar… offered rewards to those who climbed the wall first, and 
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then gave the soldiers the signal. They made a sudden swoop from all directions and quickly 
took control of the wall.”  Not expecting this sudden attack, the town of Avaricum fell to 219
Caesar and his men. 
The next big engagement would occur at the town of Gergovia near the Elaver River. 
After being outmaneuvered by Caesar, Vercingetorix moved his army into the fortifications of 
the town as he did not want to fight on unfavorable terms.  Caesar of course laid siege to the 220
town, but things did not go as smoothly as they had at Avaricum. They met heavy resistance, and 
were quickly overcome by Gallic troops. The Romans were pushed back from the wall, and 
suffered heavy losses. Vercingetorix meanwhile made the clever decision not to pursue the 
Romans once they had been pushed back, and returned to his fortifications where he had the 
advantage.  So great was the defeat at Gergovia, that Suetonius makes note of it being one of 221
the three times that Caesar failed during his Gallic campaigns (the other two being the loss of his 
fleet to a storm in Britain and the slaughter of his lieutenants at the hands of the Eburones).  222
Caesar decided to leave Gergovia behind and return to the allied lands of the Aedui. By avoiding 
direct confrontation with Caesar and approaching conflict with the Romans with caution, 
Vercingetorix managed to land a major blow to Caesar. While things looked grim for the Roman 
general, Caesar would prove that he should never be underestimated, especially when his back 
was against the wall.  
After his retreat, Caesar was able to meet up with the rest of his army, and made his way 
back towards the province of Transalpine Gaul as it was being targeted by Gallic forces.  223
219 Caesar, ​Gallic War​ 7.271 
220 ​Freeman, ​Julius Caesar​, 221. 
221 Caesar, ​Gallic War​ 7.51.4 
222 Suetonius, ​The Lives of the Caesars​ 1.25.2 
223 ​Goldsworthy, ​Caesar: Life​, 335. 
 
67 
Vercingetorix, perhaps too ambitiously, ordered his cavalry to attack the Romans’ baggage train, 
but this attack was repelled by Caesar cavalry.  The Gauls retreated back to the town of Alesia, 224
where they were once again besieged by Caesar’s forces. Caesar had the Gauls trapped, as the 
citadel of Alesia was surrounded by natural barriers.  The Romans set about trapping the Gauls 225
in their fort: “He had a trench dug that was twenty feet wide... He placed the rest of the 
fortifications four hundred feet back from that ditch...Behind this open space he had two trenches 
dug all around, both fifteen feet wide and of equal depth...Behind these ditches he built a wall of 
earth and rubble crowned by a palisade, twelve feet high in total...”  Caesar’s fortifications 226
would help keep the Gauls in, but they would also help repel any forces hoping to relieve those 
at Alesia. This proved useful, as a massive relief force arrived to try and break the siege. The 
Gauls attempted to overtake the Romans on three separate occasions, but because of Caesar’s 
fortifications and effective leadership, he was able to defeat them every time.  Vercingetorix 227
realized he had been defeated and surrendered. Caesar had once again subjugated Gaul. 
In the same way that Sertorius challenged Pompey, Vercingetorix challenged Caesar. Just 
like in Pompey’s case in Spain, Caesar experienced major setbacks against his Gallic foe. 
However, this is where another big distinction between Pompey and Caesar can be made. Where 
Pompey shifted towards caution and slowly wearing down his formidable enemy, Caesar went in 
the complete opposite direction. He played into his strengths, using bold and tricky tactics to get 
the better of his enemy. This contrast between the two is shown heavily over the course of the 
Civil War.  
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This was the last major war Caesar fought in Gaul. His conquests had taken him far from 
his initial province that he had been granted governorship over. He had led his army across Gaul, 
into Germany, and even to the far off land of the Britons. The amount of land that Caesar had 
conquered for Rome was staggering, and his name was truly known all throughout the Republic. 
Caesar had set out at the beginning of the Gallic campaigns to make a name for himself as a 
military leader, and he had done just that. His quick thinking and often times unorthodox 
methods launched him to the forefront of great Roman generals. Even when things had looked 
bleak, Caesar had pressed onwards, sometimes against the protest of those around him. His 
stubbornness, trickery, and superb leadership helped Caesar bring Gaul to its knees. 
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Chapter 6: The (not so) Celebrated Return 
After the end of the Gallic Wars, Caesar was not afforded much time for respite before he 
famously crossed the Rubicon and entered into his conflict with Pompey. However, in the short 
time that follow the end of his Gallic campaign, Caesar was constantly maneuvering himself 
politically, wary of what was to come upon his return home. The reason for this was, once he 
was no longer governor of Gaul, he would no longer be afforded the privileges of the position. 
The most important of these privileges was that he was free from any and all prosecution. 
Through his connections in Rome, he had been able to extend his time away in Gaul (of course 
always saying that his presence was needed), but with his governorship nearing its end, Caesar 
faced potentially devastating lawsuits over his first consulship and his actions in Gaul. Cato had 
long swore that Caesar would face criminal prosecution, so the question was not if but when.  228
Of course, Caesar did not intend to simply go down without a fight. Originally, his plan 
was to run for (and presumably win) another consulship, once again making him immune to 
prosecution. However, the optimates had not been idle while Caesar was away in Gaul, and had 
been working hard to dismantle the Triumvirate. With the death of Crassus after his failed 
conquest of Parthia, all that remained was the friendship between Pompey and Caesar. With the 
death of Caesar’s daughter, the marriage that had so long secured the alliance between the two 
generals ended. Additionally, Caesar’s exploits in Gaul must have bothered the famed Roman 
Alexander, as Caesar’s achievements were beginning to overshadow Pompey’s own. The 
optimates capitalized on this, and during Pompey’s time as consul while Caesar was in Gaul, 
they got him to approve of a piece of legislation that would require candidates for office to 
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actually be present in Rome to be eligible for election.  Even before the eruption of the Civil 229
War, the optimates had begun to dig their claws into Pompey.  
Caesar was not just going to sit back and let his opponents win. He set out on a campaign 
to win the hearts of the common people. It was during this time that Caesar published his books 
on the Gallic War. While most citizens would have definitely heard of Caesars exploits at this 
time, they only knew the end result and not the specifics of his adventures. The publication of his 
campaigns showed Caesar’s brilliance and his abilities. He also spent much of the money he had 
made in Gaul lavishly on public works, and was able to veto an optimate backed proposal to 
revoke citizenship from the people of Comum, which Caesar had helped establish just a few 
years prior.  All of this was meant to help build up Caesar’s popular base, especially among the 230
tribunes.  Pompey’s efforts against Caesar went about as well as expected: “Pompey, 231
accordingly, as he could affect nothing in any other way, proceeded without any further disguise 
to harsh measures and openly said and did everything against Caesar; yet he failed to accomplish 
anything,”  Pompey was ineffective in stopping Caesar’s political maneuvering. 232
Things continued to deteriorate however, as Caesar simply refused to disband his army, 
knowing the firestorm that would follow if he did. Meanwhile, Pompey too had begun to prepare 
for what seemed inevitable. Things did look up for a short while however, as the senate passed a 
proposal that both Caesar and Pompey dismiss their armies simultaneously. This would surely 
have eased tensions amongst the two parties, but the optimates were not so willing to go along 
with the senate’s plan. They wished to see Caesar crushed, and illegally gave Pompey command 
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of two more legions, which Pompey happily accepted.  If he was not already, Pompey was 233
officially in the pockets of the optimates.  
The optimates actions essentially ended any chance at a peaceful resolution. While 
Caesar did propose to the senate that he be allowed to keep his army until becoming consul, but 
the senate declined.  The stage had been set for civil war, as Pompey and Caesar were 234
unwilling to disband their armies. Caesar had everything to lose and nothing to gain from 
backing down to the optimates, especially with Pompey on their side. Caesar’s political 
maneuvering had done much to win the hearts of the common people, but the optimates were 
unwilling to back down. Pompey was firmly in the hands of Caesar’s enemies, and it had become 
clear that a diplomatic resolution was no longer possible. The optimates planned to used Pompey 
to destroy his former ally, and bring down what they saw as the most dangerous populare since 
Marius.  
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Part 3 
Chapter 7: Clash of Two Egos 
When Caesar realised that all attempts to work with the senate and find a diplomatic 235
resolution had failed, he turned to military action. By crossing the Rubicon River, Caesar was 
leaving his province of Cisalpine Gaul and leading an army against the state. Many in Rome 
were unprepared for Caesars sudden advance. Much of his army was still stationed in Gaul, so 
many believed that he would at the very least wait for them to join him before making a move on 
Rome.  With Rome in disarray, Caesar was able to take the city of Arminium and begin his 236
consolidation of Italy.  The senate should have learned by now however, that Caesar was not a 237
man of convention. Caesar’s surprise advance was completely in character; he had caught the 
optimates unprepared. 
Things were not looking particularly good for Pompey. While he technically had the 
numerical advantage, Caesar’s quick advance seemed to be facing little resistance.  Even if he 238
was able to hold off or even defeat Caesar’s veteran troops in Italy, he would still have to worry 
about those loyal to Caesar in Gaul, as they would surely arrive in Italy before reinforcements 
from Spain could. Therefore he made the smart, and characteristically cautious, decision to 
withdraw from Rome and set about raising new troops to fight his new enemy. He took with him 
many senators, declaring that any who stayed behind were supporters of Caesar.  While 239
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Pompey was essentially leaving the city of Rome to Caesar, he was leaving it empty but for a 
few senators who stayed behind as even the reigning consuls abandoned the city. He may have 
been leaving the city behind, but he was taking any possible chance Caesar had at claiming 
legitimacy with him. Without any senatorial or consular support, Caesar would be little more 
than illegitimate upstart.  
Without anyone defending the city, Caesar was able to walk into Rome unopposed. He 
was able to take many cities of Italy in this manner, for Pompey had taken his legions and his 
senate supporters with him and set off to the coastal city of Brundisium. It was here that Pompey 
planned to embark from Italy and flee to Greece where he could continue to raise new forces.  240
When Caesar learned of Pompey’s plans, he quickly set off towards Brundisium, hoping to cut 
his enemy off. However, for the first time Caesar’s legendary speed failed him, and he was 
beaten to the city.  By the time Caesar had arrived, Pompey had already sent away half his 241
army to Greece and was awaiting the return of his ships.  Caesar besieged the city, hoping to 242
keep Pompey and his forces in Italy, however this would quickly prove difficult. The harbor 
remained open, as Caesar had no navy to blockade it, so once Pompey’s ships returned he would 
be able to leave unopposed. Caesar’s main advantage at this point was that his enemy was 
divided, so it was integral that he keep it that way. To make up for his lack of boats, he set about 
creating a floating causeway at the narrowest part of the port.  While certainly not an ordinary 243
way of blockading a port city, Caesar rarely was.  
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Pompey’s ships returned before Caesar was able to fully complete his causeway, but 
Caesar’s uncompleted machination would still prove a formidable obstacle for Pompey if he 
attempted to flee. Additionally, if Pompey ordered his men to embark, it would leave the city 
undefended and Caesar’s men would be right on their heels. While this was truly a distressing 
situation, Pompey was able to put his skills as a general to work. He had been harassing Caesar’s 
men daily, using merchant ships that he had commandeered and armed with catapults.  He also 244
set about placing obstacles throughout the city (trenches, spikes, etc.) so as to impede any 
advances made by Caesar’s men. While Caesar’s army was made aware of these obstructions by 
the people of Brundisium, Pompey’s efforts were still enough to get him and the rest of his army 
out of Brundisium (minus two ships that had gotten stuck on Caesar’s barrier).  Caesar had 245
been beaten and left behind. While Cassius Dio harshly criticized Pompey’s decision to sail to 
Greece, “... Pompey… deserted his country and the rest of Italy.... Hence he gained the opposite 
fortune and reputation.” the disadvantage this put Caesar at should be noted.  With no way to 246
pursue his foe and more enemies ready to pounce in Spain, Caesar was stuck in Italy while 
Pompey was free to build up his forces.His legendary speed had failed him and Pompey had 
broken through Caesar’s flimsy attempts and blockading him in. Pompey had, in a way, won the 
first confrontation of the war.  
The siege of Brundisium also marked a big change in how Caesar approached the war. In 
his own telling of the events, Caesar makes repeated mention of his efforts to find a diplomatic 
resolution, even after crossing the Rubicon. This continued into the siege of Brundisium, but 
these efforts, like all the others, had failed. It is here that Caesar notes that he gave up on any 
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hope of a peaceful resolution to the war, and instead decided, “...to focus entirely on the war.”  247
His efforts at diplomacy should be taken with a grain of salt however, especially seeing as how 
his commentary on the war can be viewed as a piece of propaganda (though it was never 
published).  The war was still going on, and Caesar was making no attempt at slowing down 248
his military activities across the Italian peninsula. Cicero, in a letter to his friend Atticus, vented 
his frustration over Caesar’s continued military aggression.  However hollow Caesar’s 249
diplomatic attempts may have been, Brundisium marked the moment in which the war had truly 
begun.  
Caesar’s chance at bringing a decisive end to the war had slipped through his fingers. 
Pompey’s navy would have been formidable even if Caesar did have a navy, so pursuing him to 
Greece was out of the question.  Even if Caesar had been able to pursue his rival, he still would 250
have had to worry about Pompey’s forces stationed in Spain. If Caesar left Italy, nothing would 
stop them from moving in and reclaiming the peninsula, undoing all of Caesar’s work and 
destroying more of the little legitimacy he had. This is why he instead decided to head to Spain 
so as to subdue this threat. Meanwhile, he ordered new ships to be requisitioned and delivered to 
Brundisium so that once he returned from Spain he could continue his pursuit of Pompey.  251
While Caesar was distracted in Spain, Pompey was free to continue to raise troops in Greece. He 
knew that his greatest strength against Caesar’s veteran army would be sheer numbers, and with 
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the support of both consuls and the senate he was able to begin raising an army that would dwarf 
Caesar’s. Pompey had successfully outmaneuvered Caesar.  
 
Over the next year, Caesar campaigned against Pompey’s forced in Africa and, despite a 
few hiccups, was mostly successful. Additionally, he was able to earn the title of dictator (and 
later consul) thanks to one of his supporters in Rome, since the consuls were not present in the 
city.  Caesar now had a legitimate title and was no longer breaking the law by being present in 252
Rome. With his hastily crafted navy now assembled in Brundisium, he finally had the means to 
cross the Adriatic Sea and confront Pompey. 
Of course, Pompey did not spend his year in Greece simply waiting for Caesar to arrive. 
Caesar writes that Pompey had collected a large sum of money and grain from nearby provinces 
in Asia. He had been able to raise nine legions of Roman citizens as well as assembling a large 
force of foreign allies: “Such an assembly of soldiers from the nations of the Mediterranean and 
beyond had not been seen since the days of Alexander the Great.”   If Caesar had thought that 253
he would be able to cross the Adriatic uncontested, he was very mistaken. Pompey had continued 
to add to his navy, and was actively patrolling the entire west coast of Greece. While Caesar had 
been so preoccupied in Spain, Pompey was creating a full fledged war machine. He was truly 
ready for the arrival of his once protege.  254
Leading Pompey’s fleet was none other than Caesar’s previous fellow consul and 
political enemy Bibulus. Caesar had disgraced him, and now he was the only thing standing 
between Caesar and Greece. A full on naval battle would prove disastrous for Caesar, so instead 
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Caesar needed to find a way to circumvent the enemy fleet and surprised everyone with his next 
move. Since it was still winter, everyone in Pompey’s camp assumed that Caesar would wait 
until spring to embark, when sailing conditions would be better. However, when the winter was 
half done, Caesar and his army crossed the Adriatic with considerable speed and were able to 
avoid Bibulus, thus safely landing in Greece. When Bibulus caught wind of this, he immediately 
went out to prevent any further enemy movements by sea, and was actually able to catch the fleet 
on its return voyage to Brundisium. The damage had been done, however, and Caesar had once 
again defeated Bibulus by forging through unfavorable conditions.  255
After making landfall in Greece, Caesar quickly set about capturing towns along the coast 
and made his way north towards the town of Dyrrachium. This was a great concern to Pompey, 
as Dyrrachium served as both his military depot and his supply center for the region.  What 256
followed was very similar to what happened in Brundisium, as both armies quickly raced 
towards the town. Once again, Pompey was able to defeat Caesar’s legendary speed and was able 
to arrive in Dyrrachium and establish camp.  When Caesar arrived, he saw Pompey’s larger 257
force and decided against fully engaging his enemy. 
A standoff ensued. Caesar thought it best to wait for reinforcements and supplies from 
Italy before making a move against his enemy, and instead spent his time attempting to win the 
favor of nearby communities in hopes of earning supplies.  Pompey was cautious to meet his 258
foe in battle. While Caesar had been able to secure some territory along the coast, Pompey still 
had his impressive naval blockade roaming the Adriatic. Anyone attempting to cross the Adriatic 
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would have to find some way through Pompey’s navy, which was extremely vigilant after Caesar 
had slipped past them.  Caesar was behind enemy lines and quickly consuming supplies, so 259
Pompey’s strategy was very similar to when he fought against Sertorius: he was going to wear 
his enemy down. Instead of advancing, Pompey waited to see what Caesar’s next move would 
be.  
Luckily for Caesar, Marcus Antonius was able to encourage and lead reinforcements on 
one final expedition across the Adriatic and avoid Pompey’s navy, landing north of Dyrrachium. 
Caesar’s loyal follower quickly joined his commander, and together they were able to cut off 
Pompey’s supply lines.  Quickly realizing that he had been outmaneuvered, Pompey fortified 260
himself on a plateau just a few miles southeast of Dyrrachium that had easy access to the sea, 
and called for his navy to begin shipping him supplies. Pompey was still wary to engage his 
rival, and while Caesar had received reinforcements from Italy, it was unlikely that anyone else 
was coming to relieve him (as most of his more vehement supporters were with him), and so 
Pompey continued to pursue his tactic of wearing down his foe.  
Seeing his foe’s advantageous position on the plateau, Caesar set out to fortify the 
surrounding hills with forts and a wall, effectively besieging Pompey. While it may seem odd for 
a smaller force like Caesar’s to lay siege against such a large army, this was exactly why Caesar 
did it. Once word spread that Pompey had found himself under siege by Caesar, people would 
quickly begin to question their loyalties, and perhaps begin supporting Caesar instead. 
Additionally, since Pompey had been so reluctant to fully engage Caesar in battle, to many it 
would look as though he was hiding from Caesar in fear.  A letter to Cicero confirms Caesar’s 261
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supporters desired to humiliate Pompey and use it as propaganda.  While Pompey was not in a 262
particularly dire situation (as he still had plenty of incoming supplies), it would not have been 
hard to paint it as such. His tactic of waiting out Caesar may have been effective in wearing 
down his enemy, but it did him no favors in terms appearances. Caesar’s plan was dangerous and 
reckless (as it forced him to spread his army thin), but was completely in his nature. His erratic 
strategies usually had a way of working out. 
Once again the two parties found themselves at a bit of a standoff. Caesar’s tactics and 
fortifications were not so different from the ones he had used at Alesia against Vercingetorix, 
although here he was using them on a much larger scale.  In a way, Pompey and Caesar found 263
themselves fighting an early style of trench warfare. Their armies found themselves frequently 
skirmishing as they attempted to take one another's fortifications, never really making progress. 
While this was definitely a sustainable type of warfare for Pompey, Caesar found himself in dire 
straits. Although in his own commentary, Caesar says Pompey was the one suffering (as he had 
cut off Pompey’s water sources), other accounts suggest otherwise. Appian claims that Caesar’s 
army was starving, and was scavenging for any kind of food it could find.  Though Caesar does 264
make some mention of this, he focuses more on Pompey’s hardships than his own. Pompey’s 
tactics were working; his enemy was starving and struggling to keep up with his larger force. 
Caesar, in his arrogance, had spread his army thin by sieging Pompey, and this 
overaggresiveness had led to serious logistical problems.  It was only a matter of time before an 265
opportunity presented itself for Pompey. 
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Pompey finally got the opportunity he wanted in the form of two Alloborgan brothers that 
defected from Caesar’s camp. With them, they brought money, horses, and, most importantly, 
information. Caesar writes, “... the brothers… reported everything of note to Pompey: any part of 
the fortifications that remained unfinished, any shortcomings... , schedule of routine events, 
distances between locations, and the variations in attentiveness among guard posts…”  With 266
this information, Pompey could finally break the siege, and show everyone that his caution did 
yield results. With the defectors information and his own knowledge of the battlefield, Pompey 
was able to more effectively attack Caesar fortifications, bringing the end of the siege ever 
closer. It finally came when Pompey assaulted the southern part of Caesar’s wall that had been 
left unfinished. Pompey’s men poured into the breach and established a new camp. Caesar 
launched a counterattack, but failed as his men got lost in the maze of trenches and other 
fortifications, leading to a full on rout.  Pompey had outmaneuvered Caesar, and Caesar was 267
now faced one of the greatest losses of his military career. Appian claims that Pompey was able 
to capture, “...a large number of their standards, and only just failed to take the eagle....”  268
Classicist Gregory S. Bucher says it best: “The simple fact remains that Caesar had gambled and 
lost, and that he himself bore a good share of the responsibility for this loss. All he could do was 
cut his losses and move on.”  Caesar was on the run.  269
Even though Caesar had been defeated and was in flight from Dyrrachium, Pompey did 
not push his advantage. Even Caesar recognized that his army had faced total annihilation, 
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saying that the only reasons they were able to continue was because, “Pompey feared an 
ambush… he was completely surprised by what was happening…”  Additionally, Pompey’s 270
greatest strength (his cavalry) had difficulty navigating the extensive fortifications, depriving 
him of one of his greatest assets and therefore more vulnerable to a surprise attack. It seems as 
fruitful as his caution had been so far, here it did him no favors. If Pompey had simply pressed 
the attack, he would have seen the end of the war so many in his camp wanted. Appian provides 
a useful opinion on the matter, proposing that Pompey was hesitant, “...perhaps because he 
suspected the absence of defenders on the fortification was a trap…”  This would make sense, 271
as Pompey was surely aware (thanks to the publication of the Gallic Wars) of Caesar’s tendency 
to lay traps for his enemies. Therefore it would be wrong to say that a certain amount of caution 
was unwarranted. However, Pompey’s cautious nature did him no favors on this day, and Caesar 
was free to flee. Appian quotes Caesar, “Today my enemies would have finished the war if they 
had a commander who knew how to win a victory.”   272
The siege of Dyrrachium shows the fundamental difference between Pompey and Caesar; 
Caesar tends to throw caution to the wind while Pompey embraces it. Had the roles been 
reversed, Caesar surely would have pressed the attack and put an end to the Civil War. This does 
not mean that Caesar’s approach to warfare was necessarily superior to Pompey’s as both styles 
saw results. Pompey’s approach took longer, but by being wary of conflict he could avoid 
unnecessary casualties. Caesar’s unpredictability and brash nature helped him win many battles, 
but sometimes costed of many of his soldiers their lives (as it did here). Just because Caesar 
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would have pressed the advantage does not mean that his approach to warfare is superior to 
Pompey’s. 
Pompey had achieved a great victory nonetheless. When all had doubted his abilities, his 
meticulous evaluation of his situation won him the day, and his already starving enemy was now 
in flight. Caesar had been right in thinking that laying siege to Pompey would make many 
question Pompey’s ability to win the war. Now the tides had turned, and Caesar was running 
away outmanned and undersupplied. It would be much harder now for Caesar to convince 
anyone that victory was within his grasp. Pompey had complete control of the area, all he had to 
do now was wait for his enemy to crumble.  
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Chapter 8: The Battle of Pharsalus 
With Caesar fleeing east and essentially trapped in Greece by Pompey’s navy, Pompey 
easily could have crossed back into Italy, reclaimed the peninsula, and taken Rome. However, 
this would only have symbolic meaning and have no real military advantages. If left to his own 
devices, Caesar could regroup and gather reinforcements. Victory would only come once Caesar 
had been defeated.  Even though Pompey could not invade Italy, chasing his enemy down also 273
came with its fair share of problems. While Caesar had been defeated at the siege of Dyrrachium, 
he managed to find a silver lining. By moving east, he could lure Pompey away from the 
resources he had amassed at Dyrrachium and, “... force him to seek a decision in a battle fought 
under equal conditions.”  Caesar had truly underestimated Pompey at Dyrrachium. He had 274
attempted to use brute force and sheer will to trap Pompey, but his enemy had remained clear 
headed and the siege failed. If Caesar was going to be victorious, he was going to have to be 
more careful. Getting Pompey away from the safety of Dyrrachium was imperative.  
Caesar was not the only one who could play the political game. While a worse politician 
than Caesar, Pompey still knew the power of public opinion. He was able to take Caesar’s 
strategy -to use the siege of Dyrrachium as propaganda- and turn it on his enemy, by sending 
dispatches all throughout Greece telling of Caesar’s defeat.  As Caesar was already struggling 275
resource wise even at Dyrrachium, this made it more difficult for him. His desperation can be 
seen when his army approached the Greek town of Gomphi. While the townspeople had once 
supported the rebellious Roman, they now turned their backs on what they saw as a lost cause. 
Truly in need of a win, Caesar set upon the town, quickly took it, and gave it to his troops as 
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plunder.  As Philip Freeman points out, this was out of character for Caesar, especially 276
considering how he had approached the Civil War thus far: “Caesar rarely allowed such license 
to his men as it was bad for discipline and contrary to his stated goal of mercy for all…”  While 277
this was a Greek town and not necessarily a Roman one, its sacking still portrays an image that 
Caesar was trying to avoid. He wanted to distance himself from the slaughters that occurred 
during the time of Marius and Sulla, and plundering a town goes against this. News of the sack 
of Gomphi, and the Greek community was wary to shut their doors to Caesar again. However, 
they were not welcoming him because they believed in him, but because they feared him. Caesar 
was compromising his mission just to stay afloat.  
Meanwhile, things had begun to fall apart in Pompey’s camp. He had already faced 
mounting criticism at Dyrrachium for allowing himself to be besieged by a smaller force with 
little supplies. Now that Caesar was on the run, many saw the war as essentially over. A couple 
of optimates in Pompey’s camp had actually begun fighting over who would succeed Caesar as 
pontifex maximus (essentially the head priest of Rome), focusing more on politics and their 
future ambitions then the conflict ahead.  With a bright future apparently just ahead of them, 278
frustration with Pompey and his strategy of attrition was only continuing to grow among the 
optimates.  
First and foremost, Pompey had to worry about Cato (arguably the most well known 
optimate in Pompey’s camp). Even though Pompey and Cato were on the same side, tension 
between the two still existed from Pompey’s days in the First Triumvirate. Pompey feared that 
once Caesar was defeated, Cato would force him to lay down his command (and his authority 
276 Ibid., 3.80.7 
277 ​Freeman, ​Julius Caesar​, 277. 
278 Plutarch, ​Pompey​ 67. 
 
85 
along with it), so Pompey had been keeping him at a distance.  This was another reason for his 279
desire to prolong the war. Though he had managed to keep Cato at an arm's length, Pompey still 
had to deal with the optimates that had stayed with him in his own camp. Plutarch cites Domitius 
Ahenobarbus, an optimate and defender of the aristocracy, as referring to Pompey as 
“Agamemnon” (a mythical Greek leader that is known for being “vainglorious and 
overambitious”).  Additionally, he cites Favonius, another optimate, as saying, “Men, will we 280
have to go another year without gathering figs in Tusculum?”  All of this chatter was occuring 281
as Pompey’s army chased Caesar to Pharsalus. Pompey’s war of attrition had had an unforeseen 
effect. It was no longer just about who could keep their army supplied longer, but also who could 
convince their men to stay loyal longer as well. Pompey was being set in on from all sides by his 
optimate allies. They all desired an end to the war, and saw their leader’s apprehension toward a 
final confrontation as selfish and as an obstacle to their ambitions. Despite his better judgement, 
and perhaps out of desperation to keep his camp and the optimates loyal and happy, Pompey 
conceded to the critics in his camp and decided to try and face Caesar in battle.  
Though Caesar had been able to secure some supplies for his soldiers through his act of 
terror at Gomphi, he was surely still less well off than Pompey (who had yet to face the food 
shortages that Caesar had). Appian points out the disagreement amongst historians about just 
how many troops each side had exactly, but it is safe to say that Pompey had around double that 
of Caesar.  Pompey’s greatest advantage was still his cavalry, which greatly outnumbered 282
Caesar’s. Caesar arrived first at Pharsalus and quickly acquired an advantageous position. He set 
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up camp just north of a bridge that crossed the Enipeus river, which effectively blocked the way 
south and also secured him plenty of grain in the surround area.  The cold of winter and spring 283
had finally let up and summer had set in, allowing for grain fields to once again be plentiful.  284
Pompey arrived and, after realizing that the way south had been blocked by enemy forces, set up 
camp upon a hill looking down at the river.  
Caesar was ready for things to play out in the same way as they had so many times 
before, with both sides unwilling to make the first move. Pompey would deploy his troops, but 
keep them at the base of hill, which would force the Caesarian army to fight uphill and at a 
disadvantage.  Caesar had no intention to advance then, since it would have led to a quick 285
defeat for his much smaller force. Therefore, he planned to continue playing Pompey’s game and 
remain on the run. His reasoning was like this: “...he would acquire readier access to grain 
supplies… while on the march he might find some opportunity to fight a battle… with those 
daily marches, he could wear out Pompey’s army, which was unaccustomed to such exertion.”  286
At this point it is unlikely that Caesar was aware of the situation in his enemy’s camp. He had no 
way of knowing that Pompey’s own men had, in a way, turned on him and rejected his strategy. 
When Pompey had begun advancing from his advantageous position on the hill, Caesar had 
already given the order to begin packing up camp. Realizing that this might be his only chance, 
Caesar quickly readied his men for battle: “We need to put off our march for now and turn our 
thoughts to battle… Let’s take courage and be prepared to fight. It will not be easy to find 
another chance later.”   287
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Though outright battle had not been Pompey’s preferred plan, he still knew how to come 
up with an effective strategy that utilised his strengths. He approached Caesar with the river on 
his right flank, thereby making any attack from that direction infeasible. He had lined his troops 
up to face the enemy, but had done something slightly out of the ordinary that exploited his 
strength in numbers. His battle line was made up of cohorts, “... ten ranks deep, a much thicker 
formation than was usual.”  Caesar would have difficulty breaking through this line if he stuck 288
to a frontal assault. Pompey’s reinforced rear also insured that inexperienced troops would 
continue fighting, as there would be nowhere for them to go except forward and attack the 
enemy.  
Goldsworthy does point out that Pompey’s strategy came with its disadvantages, namely 
that troops in the back were under utilised and would not even be able to properly throw their 
pila at the enemy.  However, Pompey was not relying on his infantry to win him the day; that 289
burden went to his cavalry. It would be left up to his horsemen to overwhelm Caesar’s own 
outnumbered cavalry and flank the enemy infantry on the right flank. Caesar’s left flank was 
protected by the river, but his right flank was completely open. Since Roman soldiers held their 
shields with their left arm (as Pompey was clearly aware), their right flank was particularly 
vulnerable, especially to a cavalry charge.  Even though his advance had lost him the advantage 290
of an elevated position, Pompey was still able to use the geography around him in his favor.  
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Philip Freeman describes Pompey’s plan as “...brilliant, innovative, and sure to 
succeed…”  Pompey was playing to his strengths, and covering his weaknesses. Caesar’s 291
infantry may have been more experienced, but fighting through a wall of infantry would be 
difficult for them, especially with cavalry harassing their exposed flank. Pompey’s plan did have 
the unfortunate weakness of being heavily reliant on the success of the cavalry. If Caesar could 
find a way to beat them, he would have a chance at coming out victorious. He had to find a way 
to do so with his own, smaller force of cavalry.  
As the two armies advanced toward each other, Caesar gave the order to charge. As they 
rushed forward, however, they noticed that Pompey’s forces were not charging, and were instead 
waiting for Caesar’s men to meet them. By not charging, Pompey was keeping his inexperienced 
troops in formation. He hoped that by the time the two armies clashed Caesar’s troops would be 
tired from running.  Caesar chastises this move in his own commentary, saying that by forcing 292
his men to remain stationary, Pompey was dampening the “...spirited energy and enthusiasm...” 
that is “...innate by nature in all  men…”  Even in this final confrontation, Pompey was 293
showing his characteristic constraint and caution. 
Upon recognizing Pompey’s strategy (i.e. waiting for Caesar’s troops to come to his)- 
Caesar says that his men collectively stopped on their own.  This gave them time to rest before 294
they continued their charge, hurling their spears at their enemy as they went. The two forces 
collided and switched to fighting with their swords. There was no turning back now, the future of 
the Roman Republic was to be decided here on the plains of Pharsalus. Though inexperienced, 
291 ​Freeman, ​Julius Caesar​, 280. 
292 Caesar, ​Civil War​ 3.92.2 
293 Ibid., 3.92.4 
294 Ibid., 3.93.1 
 
89 
Pompey’s men were able to hold together while they waited for the cavalry to take the left flank. 
Plutarch states that Pompey was hesitant at first to bring up his right wing as he waited to see 
what his cavalry was doing.  Luckily for him, his cavalry was seeing early success. Though 295
inexperienced like the rest of his army, his cavalry was able to overwhelm Caesar’s, who quickly 
began to give ground. As Pompey’s cavalry advanced, his archers and other light infantry 
pressed forward behind them, intent on backing up the horsemen. Pompey was right to be 
cautious, as his entire plan relied on his cavalry being successful. Thankfully, they seemed to 
have been victorious, and victory within their grasp.  
Pompey’s cavalry chased down the retreating horsemen, and began to round Caesar’s 
right flank. With Caesar’s cavalry broken and his right flank completely open, it seemed ( to 
Pompey’s cavalry) that Caesar’s demise was imminent. Suddenly, Caesar gave the signal, and a 
line of troops that had been lying in wait behind Caesar’s main line (thus blocking them from the 
view) set upon the cavalry. Caesar had set his trap and Pompey’s men had fallen right in. Caesar 
had ordered his men to hold on to their javelins and, instead of throwing them, use them as 
spears to stab up at the enemy cavalry.  The tactic was extremely effective, and the tide of 296
battle quickly began to turn in Caesar’s favor. Before, Pompey’s cavalry could rely on their 
superior numbers to make up for lack of experience, but now they were at a disadvantage. 
Caesar’s men repeatedly stabbed upward, toward the faces of their enemies.  The Roman 297
javelin was not usually effective in hand to hand combat, as it was designed to break off after 
being thrown.   298
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In his commentary, Caesar does not mention ordering his troops to use them, but both 
Plutarch and Appian say that this was the case. If they were used in this manner, it was more 
likely that they were used for their psychological effect, as horses are generally afraid of 
spearmen.  Pompey’s cavalry quickly broke, and Caesar’s infantry were able to set upon and 299
break Pompey’s now undefended light infantry as well. Pompey’s caution and fear of engaging 
Caesar had not been misplaced. Caesar had taken his inferior numbers and turned the battle on 
his foe. By giving into the optimates, he had effectively spelled the beginning of the end. 
The tables had been turned, and Pompey’s forces now found themselves being 
outflanked. With the cavalry in flight and the light infantry broken, nothing could stop Caesar’s 
forces from circling around Pompey’s line and attacking them from the left. What was going 
through Pompey’s head at this exact moment is uncertain, but he made no move to shift his 
strategy, either out of stubborness or shock. Appian suggests that Pompey ordered his men to 
keep formation, wait for Caesar’s troops to come to them, and repel the enemy with their own 
spears, but there are some problems with this.  As was mentioned earlier, the Roman javelins 300
were generally ineffective in hand to hand combat. Additionally, Appian contradicts himself, as 
he had earlier claimed that the two armies had been marching towards one another, bringing the 
authenticity of Appian’s account into question.  Whatever the case, it seems that Pompey made 301
no move to shift tactics as his left flank was taken and his men started to become overwhelmed. 
In Pompey’s defense, there is little he could have done at this point except hope that his infantry 
could repel the enemy, as both his cavalry and light infantry had been routed and were fleeing 
the battlefield. He could only watch and hope for a miracle. 
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That miracle never came, though. Caesar had ordered his third line (which had hung back 
and stayed out of the fighting until now) to enter the fray and put more pressure on the Pompeian 
forces. These fresh troops descended upon the exhausted enemy front line infantry which quickly 
began to fall apart. The fact that they had been flanked and could see that their cavalry was in 
full flight did little to help the quickly withering morale of Pompey’s forces. Even though he had 
stacked his forces deep, Pompey’s troops could not withstand Caesar’s attack and their lines 
began to fall apart. Caesar states that once Pompey saw that his cavalry had fallen he had lost 
confidence in his ability to win, left the battlefield, and returned to his camp.  His initial 302
strategy of waiting Caesar out had been completely sound. Even after giving into the optimates 
demands, Pompey’s strategy for the Battle of Pharsalus was fairly commendable (the only 
mistake being that Pompey had made was he was overconfident in his cavalry’s ability to carry 
out their orders effectively, and made no back up plan in the event that they failed). Watching his 
defeat unfold in front of him must have been extremely frustrating and heartbreaking.  
Without their general, Pompey’s forces were routed and began fleeing, many going back 
to the camp. With victory all but assured, Caesar ordered his forces to march up the hill and take 
the enemy camp. Some of Pompey’s forces had stayed behind to guard the ramparts of the camp, 
but they too eventually succumbed to Caesar’s attack and abandoned the camps fortifications.  303
Pompey had no intention of being captured by his former ally, and quickly fled with a number of 
horsemen to the sea.  Once Caesar took the camp, many of the senators that had been staying 304
with Pompey now joined Caesar (though they had little choice in the matter).  Pompey wanted 305
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to avoid a confrontation with Caesar, and now all the optimates in his camp who had doubted 
him were witnessing why. Pompey’s instincts had been correct: a pitched battle with Caesar 
should have been avoided. 
 
Throughout the Civil War, Pompey had shown himself to be an admirable match for 
Caesar. Time and time again his tactics were brought into question by his contemporaries, but 
looking back they make logical sense. Fleeing from Italy had been looked down upon, but 
Pompey knew that if he wanted to beat Caesar he needed to do so using numbers, and with the 
rest of Caesar’s army sitting in Gaul it makes sense that Pompey would rather leave and return to 
Italy later. Caesar’s victory in Spain cannot be seen as a failure on Pompey’s part, as he had not 
been there to lead. In Greece, Pompey remained level headed, even when he was besieged at 
Dyrrachium. Though many looked at Pompey negatively for letting himself be sieged by a 
smaller force in the first place, it is easy to see that the siege was really a thinly veiled political 
move on Caesar’s part. Pompey had all the supplies he needed, while it was Caesar who was 
running the risk of starvation. When it came time to fight, Pompey had arranged things favorably 
on the battlefield. But his greatest weakness, the inexperience of his troops, was exploited by the 
clever Caesar, which led to his downfall.  
That is what it really comes down to, Pompey was a worse politician than Caesar. The 
two generals had very different approaches: Pompey was cautious and tended to hold back, while 
Caesar took risks and at times seemed to throw caution to the wind. Caesar’s tactics (when they 
worked) garnered more positive press, but both approaches to warfare are valid as long as they 
see results. As for Pompey, his strategy had been working, but his weak skills as a politician and 
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his inability to ward off the optimates and their demands led to him abandoning his plans and 
eventually his defeat. While we will never know if Pompey’s strategy would have led to Caesar’s 
defeat, it is clear to see that Pompey was leading a successful, but unpopular campaign against 
Caesar, one that he was unable to defend against the optimate senators and war leaders. 
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Conclusion 
The Battle of Pharsalus did not mark the end of the Civil War, but it was essentially the 
end of Pompey. While he had managed to avoid capture at Pharsalus, his time soon ran out. 
Pompey fled to Egypt, where perhaps he had planned to raise a new army against Caesar.  He 306
never got the chance however, as when he reached the shores of Egypt, he was betrayed. He had 
prepared to meet with Egypt’s young ruler Ptolemy, but was killed in an attempt to win favor 
with Caesar. Ptolemy’s men beheaded the former consul of Rome, and unceremoniously threw 
his body out to sea.  It was truly a tragic end for one who had once been called the Roman 307
Alexander.  
Caesar arrived in Egypt shortly after looking for Pompey, and was presented with his 
head. Ptolemy and his advisors quickly regretted their decision, as Caesar looked at them with 
fury and pain in his eyes. Dio states that, “...Caesar at the sight of Pompey’s head wept and 
lamented bitterly, calling him countryman and son-in-law, and enumerating all the kindnesses 
they had shown for each other. As for the murderers… he actually heaped reproaches upon 
them…”  This was not the end that Caesar wanted for his ally turned rival. It is ironic, and 308
horribly cruel, that Pompey’s death was used in a failed political move.  
It truly was an unfitting end to someone who had achieved so much. When compared to 
Caesar, Pompey’s journey to the forefront of the Roman consciousness is truly astonishing. 
Starting at such a young age, Pompey saw military success everywhere he went. When it comes 
down to it, Pompey was the perfect choice to face Caesar. Pompey had travelled all across 
Rome, and fought on both its eastern and western borders. In terms of experience, there was no 
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other Roman general at that time with more experience than Pompey. Over the course of his 
career as a military commander, Pompey learned the importance of caution, especially when 
dealing with a tricky foe. His approach to Caesar was therefore very similar to his approach to 
Sertorius; it was a slow war of attrition, which did not bring much glory, but it was an effective 
tactic nonetheless. Indeed, over the course of the Civil War Pompey showed himself to be more 
than adept at dealing with the troublesome Caesar. Whenever Pompey was in direct control, he 
defeated Caesar handily, whether it be the siege of Brundisium or Dyrrachium. He showed 
himself capable against Caesar’s famed speed, even beating him on multiple occasions. He even 
had Caesar on the run nearing the end of his days, with Caesar having to abandon his ideals, 
raiding villages and scrounging for food. If there was anyone who could have defeated Caesar, 
Pompey sat at the top of the list.  
Unfortunately, Pompey’s military success and experience did not help him when it came 
to being a politician. Without his army at his back, Pompey quickly learned how difficult it was 
to get the senate to do what he wanted, especially when there was a coalition of hostile optimates 
against him. He repeatedly showed his political ineptitude through failed speeches, publicity 
stunts, and horrible choices in allies. When Pompey tried to blaze his own way through Roman 
politics, he failed miserably, and it was not until Caesar approached him with an alliance that he 
began to see success. Caesar used him as a tool, for the weight of Pompey’s achievements were 
great to have as support. As the relationship between Caesar and Pompey broke down, the 
optimates dove in to dig their claws into the Roman Alexander, and use him as their tool instead.  
Perhaps if the optimates had actually allowed Pompey to carry out the war they gave to 
him, he may not have come to such a despicable fate. Pompey’s failure to persuade and stand up 
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to the optimates in his camp at the end of the Civil War highlights his failings as a politician. By 
giving in to the optimates’ demands of a swift end to the war, Pompey had essentially signed his 
own death warrant. For while his battle strategy at Pharsalus had been commendable, Caesar had 
a trick up his sleeve, just as Pompey had most likely feared, and stole the victory from him. The 
cautious Pompey that we had seen up until Pharsalus had been replaced with the reckless one we 
saw against Sertorius, and just like in Spain Pompey’s disregard for caution proved to be 
disastrous.  
The question of whether or not Pharsalus was Caesar’s victory or Pompey’s failure 
comes down to political ability as much as it does military strategy. Pompey’s failure to stand up 
the optimates was simply Pompey’s final blunder as a politician. Up until Pharsalus, it seemed 
like Pompey had Caesar on the ropes. Caesar’s military victory could not have come without 
Pompey’s political failure. Pompey’s title is fitting, for his fall was truly great. While he may 
have been defeated in the end, the successes of Pompey the Great should not be forgotten, for his 
military achievements are on par with that of Caesar’s. What Caesar had over Pompey, and why 
we remember his deeds greater than Pompey’s, were his skills as a politician and unwillingness 
to give in to his opponents.  
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